Charles G. Andres

FORCE AND STRATEGY IN A NEW ENVIRONMENT.

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Charles G. Andres

Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS

AN ABSTRACT

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PREFACE

As a student of international relations, naval and military science, and overall strategy formulation, the writer is deeply interested in the nature of the environment in which all of these are conducted. Many people are convinced that this environment is considerably different from the one that developed following World War II. They feel that world affairs and strategic matters must be analyzed in light of a "new balance"; a nuclear stalemate that has resulted in manifest relaxations of cold war tensions. This writer subscribes to this belief.

The following project was undertaken in an attempt to more clearly understand the degree of relevance that must be attached to traditional force-forms and strategic planning in a period of stalemate and accommodation. Admittedly, the problem was approached with preconceived ideas, and yet a sincere, if not always successful, effort was made to avoid a narrow evaluation of concepts.

This thesis does not necessarily constitute an exercise in research technique, although the standard procedures were utilized where it became necessary or advisable to substantiate various positions; but rather, this is an exercise in distillation and selectivity; an exercise in "theory evaluation." As such, it is an essay. Chapter titles are

PREFACE

self-explanatory and tend to indicate the logical development of the study, and the total result is not as important as the true value that was derived from the mental processes required in attaining the results. The views presented here are the product of personal evaluation and opinion; and, as a commissioned officer of the United States Navy, the author should point out, perhaps needlessly, that they do not necessarily reflect, in any way, the views of the Department of Defense.

The list of acknowledgments is lengthy, and much of the help was provided indirectly or through the normal procedure of classroom discussion. However, one party stands out as having served above and beyond the call of duty. By reading page after page of hopelessly scrambled manuscript and dutifully listening to verbalizations that never attained written form, the writer's wife contributed immeasurably to any success enjoyed by this study. Failures must remain the author's sole responsibility.

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ABSTRACT

This study reveals concern with two primary considerations: nuclear war and its influence on current international politics; and the roles of military force and strategic planning within the nuclear environment of foreign affairs. The necessity for this analysis would be questionable and the very existence of the problems that require such study would be doubtful if it were not for the real presence of war and the possibility of nuclear war as factors in international relations. The conduct of foreign relations, the methods of expressing naval and military science, and overall strategy formulation should be of deep concern to all; the nature of the environment in which all of these are conducted should be of no less importance. Many people are convinced that this environment is considerably different from the one that developed following World War II. They feel that world affairs and strategic matters must be analyzed in light of a "new balance"; a nuclear stalemate that has resulted in manifest relaxations of traditional cold war tensions. This study was thereby undertaken in an attempt to understand more clearly the degree of relevance that must be attached to traditional force-forms and strategic planning in a period of stalemate and accommodation.

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utilized where it became necessary or advisable to substantiate various positions; but rather, this is an exercise in "theory evaluation." As such, it is an essay. The logical development of the essay consists of a discussion of war in general and nuclear war in particular, the strategics of nuclear war, the development of the new environment as an outgrowth of nuclear strategics, and finally, the roles of force and strategy within the new environment.

The findings of the study are briefly as follows:

1. The presence of a new environment is real.

2. The nature of the new environment is political.

3. Policy formulation and power application have definite limitations.

4. Military objectives must be attuned to realistic political objectives.

5. There is a great need for public re-orientation to the nature of the current environment, to the realistic methods of applying policy decisions, to the practical applications of military force, and to the desperate need for redefined national purpose.

6. There is a need for prudence and moderation.

7. Force must be existent but flexible; strategy must be developed in response to realistic purpose and obtainable objectives.

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Amitai Etzioni

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CHAPTER I

WAR IN GENERAL AND NUCLEAR WAR IN PARTICULAR

Upon final analysis, this study will reveal concern with only two primary considerations: nuclear war and its influence on current international politics; and the roles of military force and strategy within the nuclear environment of foreign affairs. The necessity for this analysis would be questionable and the very existence of the problem that requires such study would be doubtful if it were not for the real presence of war and the possibility of nuclear war as factors in international relations. However, before beginning a discussion of the existing "nuclear environment" and its influence on force and strategy, it appears desirable to give a brief look at war in general and nuclear war in particular.

To accomplish this, effort shall be directed at an investigation into the nature of and motivation for war, the birth of nuclear war as a possibility, the effects of the nuclear age on war, and the present state of the art with regard to nuclear warfare. Organizationally, the latter could have been included as a glossary of current terminology, but will be made an integral part of the text in the hope of providing a common understanding of terms that will arise throughout the study.

CHAPTER I

WAR IN GENERAL AND NUCLEAR WAR IN PARTICULAR

War, in one form or another, is a fact of international life, and there are very few nations in the world that have been able to escape this reality. It is probably safe to say that the world is divided into two groups: those states who have participated in war and those that will. Although armed conflict has been constant, the motivations for it and the methods of waging and preparing for it have been infinitely variable. Clausewitz was of the belief that "war is nothing but the continuation of political relations by other means." But the modalities of the nuclear age have produced those who cast doubt upon the continued relevancy of political objectives. As one wit has pointed out, the verdict of any future war will not rest upon who is right but rather who is left. This belief will be questioned later; but, in any event, it is generally conceded that war is the reliance of force of arms in the settlement of quarrels between nations, or occasionally between two parties of the same nation. Hoffman Nickerson, a noted military historian, believed that war could be defined as the use of organized force between human groups pursuing contradictory policies.[1]

It is often possible for divergent parties to solve their differences by means of compromise so that each may

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receive compensation closely akin to original objectives. However, compromise is a voluntary procedure and cannot be effective unless both sides agree on certain principles. If this is not possible, then policy-makers must seek other techniques for achieving their goals. As a rule, once this point has been reached, the only method or option left available is war--or at least its implied threat. It thus appears that war is not only a likely product of the decision-making process but a rather logical one. That is why war as a reality cannot be ignored. War is neither a pathological accident nor an immoral and irrational exercise, but rather a central feature of the normal theory and practice of international relations.[2]

Of all the possible relationships between states, war has the unique characteristic of being both the least attractive and yet the most significant. Before the fiery birth of the nuclear age, however, there was one thing commonly accepted among potential belligerents: it was taken for granted that, with minor rectifications and changes, the post-war environment would resemble the pre-war scene. War, in other words, was important but not crucial. Its outcome possessed importance, but it certainly was not a matter of

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[2]Charles O. Lerche, America in World Affairs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 12-15.

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There are many theories on the causes and occasions of war. These include the popularized "villain," "brass-button," and "paranoic" theories. Many of these raise more questions than they answer; but man, driven by reason and the laws of logic, constantly strives for definitive causes. Perhaps the real understanding of the nature of and motivation for war lies in the psychological aspect of "war interpretation." Quincy Wright, in his article "The Psychological Approach To War and Peace," lists what he believes to be the basic motivations for war. These are: mutual fear of attack by two or more nations, rival demands for territory, urge for political power and prestige, desire for ethnic or group self-determination, a crusade for a way of life, ideology, or religion, and even sexual jealousy--which is supposed to have been the motivation behind the Homeric siege of Troy.[3] In a real sense, it may be argued that perhaps the most

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obvious cause of war is war itself, or rather the expectation of war. Since conflicts have occurred in the past, each state must consider the possibility that another may occur in the future. States will thereby take steps to protect themselves against such an eventuality by increasing, or at least sustaining, their war-making potential. By taking these steps, states tend to increase international tension and resulting insecurity can reach the point of open hostility. Wright's motivations seem to be all inclusive, and acceptance of his theory leads one to believe that wars are purely psychological in nature. This may be true, but war is too complex to lend itself to such an easy explanation. This became particularly true on July 16, 1945.

On this date, over the early morning desert of Alamogordo, New Mexico, the United States and the world became irrevocably committed to the atomic age. The following month witnessed the first utilization of atomic weapons as a means of military force. Within four years, the possession of functional atomic weapons was not the sole and dubious honor of one country, and by 1954 the atomic age had become the age of possible thermonuclear incineration.

Many speak of the advent of atomic weapons as the most momentous military invention since gunpowder. But it would appear that this questionable comparison places too much importance on the introduction of gunpowder. Not only

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It is true that the appearance of nuclear weapons had the initial impact of only furthering the belief that war was, more than ever, a matter solely of armed force. Yet, the atomic bomb, and particularly thermonuclear devices, have revolutionized the conduct of large-scale war. These awesome weapons have produced an even greater effect on the way in which warfare can be waged under the guise of peace; for example, the machinations of what is commonly referred to as the cold war. As early as 1952 and 1953, Defense Department officials in the United States were speaking of the

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total destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the "stalemate" that feasibly could result. The major nuclear powers undoubtedly recognized the flexibility that "stalemate" provided in the pursuit of political objectives. So, perhaps, the ultimate significance of nuclear weapons will be the background which they furnish to a vast array of unconventional, or psychological, methods of waging "war." The possessors of nuclear destruction seem to be faced with the strange paradox of conducting international relations in a world in which force tends to be both increasingly more available, increasingly more dangerous to use and, in practice, increasingly less usable. But the fact remains that the United States has engaged in a military effort unprecedented in history, and yet the effort has proved inadequate to the challenge. The sporadic nature of the effort has been caused by many factors, the major of which perhaps is the nature of the American historical experience. Tradition impels Americans to believe that peace is the normal relation among states--not seeming to realize the unique change rendered in the international environment. As a result, the United States has assembled an overwhelmingly powerful force designed to "punish" the disturbers of peace. The difficulty in harnessing this force to a set of realistic and comprehensible objectives surely has given the United States

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strong overtones of frustration.[4] As suggested a moment ago, the perfection of the techniques of war in the nuclear age has ironically destroyed their usefulness. Few objectives beyond sheer survival are worth the cost of victory.

Since 1945 and 1949, nuclear technique has grown comparatively simpler, the sums of money expended proportionately smaller, the time lag between the invention of nuclear and thermonuclear devices shorter. In this sense, the progression from American monopoly to a Soviet-American duopoly, and the extension to a general understanding throughout the world concerning atomic warfare, is a symbol of the course of political affairs since 1945, and has contributed unmistakably to the current environment. It may also be said that the discovery of atomic weapons has proven prejudicial to the long-range interests of the United States--and to the Soviet Union. Like the gunpowder of another age, nuclear weapons must have the ultimate result of making the small the equal of the great.[5] However, the brutal fact remains that a state cannot afford to rely on its nuclear arsenal as its chief means of waging war. This would amount to an acceptance of paralysis within the policy-making organs of government. Once again, the final result of nuclear weapons

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[4]Lerche, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

[5]Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff, The New Politics (New York: McCann, 1961), pp. 134-135.

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is to deprive force of its traditional utility, leaving the nuclear states with less usable power than they had before.

That brings us to the current state of the art. What is the "threat potential" of war today? According to Bernard Brodie,

> . . . the threat of war, open or implied, has always been an instrument of diplomacy by which one state deterred another from doing something of a military or political nature which the former did not wish the latter to do.[6]

Does this have real applicability in the new environment? That will be the principal question, content, and argument of Chapter III; however, in order to supply a minimum foundation and for the sake of completeness in this discussion of the development of all-out war, the following "characteristics" seem to apply to the present state of nuclear war:

1. In the post-World War II era, the United States has realized that security is inextricably meshed with the safety of the rest of the world. The resulting alliance system is composed of nuclear and non-nuclear states with nuclear and non-nuclear strategies.

2. In the nuclear age, industrial strength is a military asset only to the extent that it can provide armaments before the outbreak of war.

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3. In the not too distant past, national strategy was the exclusive concern of only a few men. Today, strategy is total. It involves every facet of society and should be the concern of every knowledgeable person in the world.

4. The gradual shift from possession of an atomic monopoly toward a position of virtual nuclear parity with the Soviet Union has deprived the United States of a military advantage.

5. There has been a shift from a strategy of mobilization to a strategy of deterrence.

6. War can no longer be considered a delicate surgery to a confined part of the earth's surface; it is now possible to practice universal butchery.[7]

In addition to these traits, it seems appropriate to establish at least a minimum understanding of what is meant by certain words, terms, and phrases that float around in the public domain of nuclear war lexicography. Some will reappear, others will only enjoy this single exposure. Although some are ambiguous and defined in relation to schools of thought or personal interpretation, the following descriptions are those that will be utilized within the context of

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[7]Robert Rienow, Contemporary International Politics (New York: Crowell, 1961), p. 51.

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[7] Robert Klemm, Contemporary International Politics (New York: Crowell, 1961), p. 31.

this study. It will be discovered quickly that a few of these involve as much discussion or elaboration as they do simple and antiseptic diagnosis.

1. Force: Force may assume different forms, but this study will consider force as a nation's ability to protect its national interests.

2. Strategy: The classic interpretation of strategy cannot be ignored. It is the science and art of employing armed strength in order to secure the objectives of war, and, in turn, the objectives of the state. When this is applied to the nuclear age, certain refinements and distinctions have to be made. A very considerable effort in the past few years has gone into the problem of reducing military strategy to more measurable terms than science and art. This is particularly true in the relationship of strategy to technology. Strategy has become a method of selecting the military weapons and forces to secure or retain the objectives of the nation, with objectives themselves determining or influencing the choice. Some have said that the nuclear age has rendered strategy irrelevant; but as long as nuclear war is a possibility, and as long as selection of systems is involved, then strategy will be involved. Modern weapon selection is made from a selection of technologies and is at least partially affected by policy decisions regarding economic resources. Strategy, therefore, is not an isolated

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concept. It is part of a complex interaction of national values, policy formulation, allocation of resources, and technology.[8]

3. Massive retaliation: The term and policy entered into public usage in January of 1954 in a speech by John Foster Dulles. Whether or not this usage was accompanied by a modicum of understanding is not fully documented. John Spanier cryptically says that "no policy could have been more typically American than massive retaliation."[9] The policy--or more accurately: the strategy--was designed to deter an attack from the Sino-Soviet powers by drawing a line around their periphery and creating the pointed implication that instant devastation would rain upon Moscow or Peking if the line were violated. The prevailing belief was that the United States would be relieved of reacting to external stimuli at times and places of the enemy's choosing. Military considerations were to be dominant during the ensuing war, and the only cause for war would be enemy aggression. Military power in the form of nuclear weapons were to be unleashed only in reaction to a hostile attack; the enemy could not escape without punishment or risk; and he was to

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[8]Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff (eds.), American Strategy for the Nuclear Age (New York: Doubleday, 1960), p. 176.

[9]John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 144.

concept. It is part of a complex interaction of national values, policy formulation, allocation of resources, and technology.[8]

3. Massive retaliation: The term and policy entered into public usage in January of 1954 in a speech by John Foster Dulles. Whether or not this usage was accompanied by a modicum of understanding is not fully documented. John Spanier cryptically says that "no policy could have been more typically American than massive retaliation."[9] The policy--or more accurately: the strategy--was designed to deter an attack from the Sino-Soviet powers by drawing a line around their periphery and creating the pointed implication that instant devastation would rain upon Moscow or Peking if the line were violated. The prevailing belief was that the United States would be relieved of reacting to enemy initiated attacks and places of the enemy's choosing. Military considerations were to be dominant during the existing war, and the only cause for war would be enemy aggression could not escape ultimate punishment or risk) and [illegible] [illegible] only in reaction to a hostile attack, the enemy [illegible] military power in the form of nuclear weapons prior to [illegible]

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[8] Walter F. Hahn and John W. Neff (eds.), [illegible] Strategy for the Nuclear Age (New York: [illegible]), p. 142.

[9] John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: [illegible]), p. 97.

be crushed by complete defeat. Mr. Dulles, if no one else, believed the strategy to be effective, economical, and morally superior. In brief summary, massive retaliation may be thought of as a nuclear bombardment of maximum magnitude triggered by external aggression.

4. Limited retaliation: The public tends to think of potential war in one of two extremes: all-out thermonuclear war, or limited war. Actually, there are several gradations possible between these parameters. Glenn Snyder, in his book Deterrence and Defense, suggests a strategy within what he calls a "spectrum of violence" that is somewhere short of complete incineration. This is limited retaliation. It is defined as a strategy of single, small, successive nuclear strikes directed against an opponent after the opponent has initiated tactical ground aggression of major proportions. The purpose is to deter additional aggression and to actually begin reprisal on a limited scale, with the hope of persuading the aggressor to cease and desist under pain of an eventual accumulation of human and material costs which would more than offset the advantages derived from aggression.[10]

5. Deterrence: This is indeed an enigmatic subject, but an attempt to establish a framework for future discussion

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necessitates a brief mention of this much misunderstood concept. Regardless of whose definition one chooses to use, the two principal ingredients of deterrence are cost and gain. In as few words as possible, deterrence may be defined as the discouraging of an enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk that outweighs his prospective gains. To be truly effective, this deterrence should not only project a picture of devastation if it were released, but it should also imply that world conditions are probably better prior to a nuclear war than after.

6. Graduated deterrence: This term general refers to the means employed in warfare with regard to the area of engagement. Graduated deterrence, consequently, requires that the area be restricted to a minimum and that atomic weapons of the smallest possible yield be used within this area. In essence, this calls for the use of tactical atomic weapons on a conventional battlefield. Some authorities feel that this condition is only the initial step in a process leading to all-out thermonuclear war where the involvement of nuclear weapons and the area concerned quickly expand. They construe this entire process as graduated deterrence, and it is obvious that this would perhaps satisfy the definition of "escalation" as well.

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These two terms are considered simultaneously because the understanding of one relies upon an understanding of the other. The difference between the two turns on the nature of the threat which produces deterrence; either the primary goal of the deterrent force is the elimination of the opposing military establishment, or the proper target is the aggressor's war-making potential and civilian population.[11] The former is counterforce strategy; the latter is finite deterrence.

8. Punitive capability: It may be useful to associate this term with finite deterrence. Punitive capability is the amount of destruction inflicted upon an enemy's economy and population.

9. Counterforce capability: This is quite naturally associated with counterforce strategy, and it refers to the degree of attrition which may be inflicted upon an enemy's military establishment--particularly his nuclear forces.

10. Multideterrence: It should be rather obvious that a single deterrent is unlikely to cover an entire range of contingencies with feasibility. There is a need for something more, as suggested by Henry Kissinger:

> Whatever aspect of our strategic problem we consider--mitigating the horrors of war, creating a spectrum of capabilities to resist likely Soviet challenges--we

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> are brought to recognize the importance of developing a strategy which makes room for the possibility of limited war.[12]

It has become quite apparent that a nation endowed with both nuclear and conventional military resources is in a position to voice certain claims and to make a show of force in support of those claims that is both credible and free of intolerable risk. This diversification of forces and the adoption of a strategy marked by more limited goals, but added flexibility of means, is multideterrence. Put another way, multideterrence is a strategy or posture in the same sense that massive retaliation is a strategy or posture. It is the possession of a force designed to counter every sort of threat the enemy might make wherever he might make it. Counter-aggression would thus be appropriate to the catalytic aggression.

11. Defense: Glenn Snyder believes that defense is an extension of deterrence and differs only with respect to a time frame; that is, deterrence is primarily a peacetime objective while defense is a wartime value. Another possible comparison concerns the purpose of military forces prior to enemy attack and following enemy attack. The deterrent value of these forces are enjoyed prior to attack; the defensive value is enjoyed after attack. Defense,

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[12]Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harpers, 1957), p. 172.

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[12] Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper's, 1957), p. 140.

accordingly, is the effectuation of a psychological posture with an attack upon the established forces serving as the trigger. It might even be said that defense occurs only after deterrence fails.

12. Pre-emptive attack: This type of attack is somewhat defensive in nature in that it is an attack launched after an opponent has set his own strategic attack in motion but before it is consummated.

13. Preventive attack: The public consumers of nuclear age information tend to confuse preventive attack with pre-emptive attack. There is a vital difference. Preventive attack refers to a premeditated attack by one country upon another during a period of relative calm or absence of crisis and is prompted by the belief that nuclear exchange is inevitable; that it is in the national interests to deliver the first blow--thereby enjoying the element of surprise---and that by delivering the initial strike the chances of unacceptable retaliation will be reduced substantially, if not eliminated.

14. First-strike capability: This must be viewed with reference to force. It is the amount of damage that a force would be capable of inflicting upon an enemy if it struck the enemy first.

15. Strike-back or second-strike capability. As inferred, this pertains to the degree of damage which would

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be inflicted upon an enemy after the enemy had struck first and destroyed a portion of the target nation's first-strike capability. It is obvious, of course, that any given pre-war force will have both a first-strike and a second-strike capability, depending on whether it is used before any enemy attack or after.[13] Care should be taken not to confuse second-strike capability with residual forces which either side may have left in reserve after having struck once.

16. Credibility: Credibility is applied to a situation that is worthy of belief. There may be degrees of credibility, each dependent upon the interpretation, forcefulness and/or logic that a particular situation presents. When viewed within a framework of nuclear war strategy, credibility usually refers to a psychological aura created by a nuclear power with regard to its deterrent force. In substance, it is making an enemy believe that you possess sufficient operational power to render his country and its military and economic capability helpless if he should be so foolish as to provoke you with aggression. Yet, it is not enough to simply convey the possession of such power; more importantly, it is necessary to make the enemy believe that you have the full intention of using your power as a deterrent force.

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[13] Snyder, op. cit., p. 53.

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[13] Snyder, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

17. War potential: The word potential tends to denote possibility; perhaps it would be more accurate to use the phrase "war inventory." Nevertheless, war potential is frequently utilized, and the best operational explanation--and one that does not bog down in minutia--seems to be found in the book Military Policy and National Security, edited by William Kaufmann. War potential, according to this source, includes a country's economic capacity, its administrative competence, and its morale or motivation for war.[14]

In summarization, an attempt has been made to capsulate the following considerations:

1. War, or the reliance upon force to settle divergent positions, has a long if not disappointing history of occurrence in international relations. The motivations for this conflict have varied but may be considered fundamentally psychological in nature.

2. War has historically been, and still is, an end-product of the decision-making process--and before the dawn of nuclear weapons, was a logical possibility.

3. One of the unique characteristics of nuclear technology is the emphasis that it has placed upon strategic weaponry, resulting in the offensive aspects of conflict

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being thrust into predominance at the expense of more conventional defensive techniques.

4. It is true that the environment that has resulted from the above has permitted a certain degree of flexibility in the conduct of international relations, but paradoxically the nuclear age has also largely neutralized all-out war--the very thing made possible by the advent of atomic science.

5. Lastly, a selective glossary of current terminology relating to nuclear war and strategic planning was presented in order to establish a common foundation for additional discussion.

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CHAPTER II

NUCLEAR WAR STRATEGICS

The literary, as well as the actual, construction of a foundation upon which the "new environment" must be built, and upon which military force and strategy must be considered, requires something more than a brief look at environmental characteristics and a condensation of nuclear war terminology. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to provide additional strength for that foundation by discussing the strategics of nuclear war. This will include a more detailed investigation of deterrence, the classical role of military force and its relationship to deterrence, and, finally, succinct and hopefully incisive descriptions of the nuclear strategies of Containment, Massive Retaliation, Preventive war, and Multideterrence.

Deterrence, in one sense, is simply the negative aspect of political power; it is the power to dissuade as opposed to the power to coerce or compel.[1] Country A attempts to deter Country B from committing some act considered detrimental to Country A by the implicit or explicit threat of applying some sanction if the forbidden act is performed. In conformance with the standards of current

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[1] Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 3.

military-political jargon, this strategy is generally referred to as deterrence; the difference between it and "defense" being that it is only referred to as "defense" after Country A is attacked. It is plausible to say that deterrence does not even have to depend on military force. Deterrence might take the form of a threat through trade restrictions or through the promise of economic aid; nor does deterrence have to apply only to real or imagined enemies. The deterrence of allies or neutrals can be effective, as Italy, for example, was dissuaded from fighting on the side of the Central Powers in World War I by the promise given in 1915 of substantial territorial gains. In any event, deterrence is a function of the total cost-gain expectations of the party to be deterred, and the focus shall be on military force and its related strategies.

Henry Kissinger suggests that successful deterrence requires three fundamental ingredients. These are power, the will to use that power, and a valid assessment of these by a potential aggressor.[2] These basic prerequisites appear reasonable enough, but certain aspects are not fully elaborated. Despite the simple truth contained in Kissinger's suggestion, a closer look at both sides of the "cost-risk

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equation" is necessary before analysis of a successful or unsuccessful deterrent can be made. The entire logic of deterrence is predicated upon the "cost-risk equation." The object is to reduce the probability of enemy attacks by posing for the potential aggressor a realistic prospect of a net loss as the result of any attack that he might launch. What must the aggressor assess and evaluate before reaching a decision to initiate aggression? Study reveals four points that constitute one side of the equation:

1. The value and necessity of the aggressor's proposed war objectives.

2. The price that the aggressor is willing to pay in order to achieve these objectives.

3. The type of response the target nation will make.

4. The question of being able to "stay ahead" in ensuing exchanges and ultimately win the pre-attack objectives.

The deterrer's side of the equation is similar to that of the aggressor. If the deterrer is rational, then his considerations would probably include the following:

1. The value placed on territorial protection and the amount of moral satisfaction derived by a particular type of response.

2. An estimate of the costs involved in an exchange.

3. The probability of successfully holding the

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The defender's side of the equation is similar to that of the aggressor. If the deterrent is rational, then his considerations would probably include the following:

1. The value placed on territorial protection and the amount of moral satisfaction derived by a particular type of response.

2. An estimate of the costs involved in an exchange

3. The probability of successfully foiling the

territorial objective and other values that would be at stake.

4. The effect of various responses on any future attacks by the aggressor. Ultimately, the deterrer should select the response which minimizes his expectation of cost and/or maximizes his expectation of gain.[3]

Prior to pursuing an expanded rationalization of the requirements for successful deterrence, it would seem desirable to say a brief word about defense planning. It has been suggested that deterrence is a passive form of defense. Planning for defense involves an estimate of the capabilities and intentions of other nations. If defense planning relies solely on the overt actions of other nations, then a consistent and realistic posture is extremely difficult to maintain when one considers the annual budgetary problems of the United States and the various lags that can occur between requisition, appropriation, and acquisition.

Planning for defense is complicated in another way. Defense can be accomplished by a combination of defensive and offensive means. Consider for a moment the air defense of the continental United States. In defending against an

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[3]The "cost-risk equation" concept is certainly not new. The basic rationale behind the interpretation presented here is directly attributable to Glenn Snyder's Deterrence and Defense.

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[3] The 'cost-risk equation' concept is explained in greater detail relating the interpretation of deterrence and defense.

air attack, it would be useful to possess strategic airpower to strike enemy airfields and launching sites; to possess a defensive air capability in the form of warning nets, fighter aircraft, and anti-aircraft guns or anti-missile devices capable of neutralizing enemy delivery vehicles that would undoubtedly penetrate the outer defensive shell; and to possess such passive defensive measures as dispersion, mobility, shelters, and civil defense in general. Collectively, these form a deterrent. Once again, budgetary considerations can result in conflict, confusion, and possibly in an inadequate deterrent force. Where does defense end and offense begin? Where should budgetary emphasis be placed, and who makes the decision? This appears to be particularly relevant and will be explored later in the study.

One additional point should be made with regard to defense planning. In preparation of a five-year fiscal program and in submitting a specific fiscal-year budget, the Department of Defense is currently guided by the policy requirement of "(developing) the force structure necessary to meet . . . military requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings or pre-determined financial limits, and to procure and operate this force at the lowest possible cost."[4]

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[4]Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1965-69 Defense Program and 1965 Defense Budget, presented before a joint session of the Senate Sub-Committee on Defense Appropriations

This presents the interesting puzzle of determining and recognizing the point of diminishing returns, where each additional increment of resources used produces a proportionately smaller increment of overall defense capability. Secretary McNamara suggests that this problem applies to the question of qualitative improvements in weapons systems as well as to quantitative increases in the force level.

The complex relationship between what properly constitutes a successful deterrent and how that deterrent is to be designed, operated, and maintained lies beyond the predetermined scope of this study. But in view of what has been said, the following minimum considerations should be made in determining a successful deterrent:

1. The defender should possess the appropriate forces designed to meet the specific type of attack a potential aggressor is capable of launching and the type of attack that he most likely intends to launch.

2. The defender must be willing to use his military force if sufficiently provoked.

3. The potential aggressor must have a reasonably accurate estimate of the defender's capabilities and intentions.[5]

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and Senate Armed Services Committee (Washington: Department of Defense, January, 1964), p. 2.

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4. The defender must take into account the values of the potential aggressor, and this is of principal importance if they differ from his own.

5. The potential aggressor must be rational.

It is recognized that there are many variables embedded among these basic requirements—such as the number and type of aggressor attack vehicles likely to be used, the timeliness and reliability of the defender's warning system, the aggressor's threshold of unacceptable damage, plus many more. For effective deterrence, though, the most relevant consideration is how these variables are estimated by the potential attacker. If it is assumed that a possible attacker is rational—and this was one of the requirements for successful deterrence—then basic deterrence involves little strain on credibility. The enemy would appreciate the purpose; the question is one of feasibility. The road to nuclear evaporation is paved with good intentions.

The strategy of deterrence should always consider the possibility of "deterrence failure." Therein lies the problem of feasibility. Deterrence could fail despite military strength, and curiously enough, because of it. Identifying deterrence with maximum power tends to paralyze the will. It requires a country to stake survival on the credibility of a threat which could become increasingly difficult to implement and, if implemented, would result in the very type

of war that the original strategy was designed to avoid. There is a possibility of being trapped in an inverse relationship: as strength increases, will to use strength decreases.

In America, however, traditions tend to rule out any thoughts that are based on the assumption that the American people will, at the most critical moment, be subject to the same kind of errors which humans have always been susceptible to—such as deficiencies in alertness, judgment, or failure to maintain singleness of purpose. There is a belief that the "Great Deterrent" will work simply because it must work. David McLellan, in his Theory and Practice of International Relations, points out that

> . . . instead of developing our military potential along diversified lines designed to contain the Soviets at a minimum cost to ourselves, we based our military strategy upon a fleeting superiority of atomic air power which, in the end, we were unwilling to employ and which, as Korea showed, did not make us invulnerable to aggression. Military power is only meaningful in relation to strategy and strategy is only meaningful in relation to national objectives and willingness to pursue those objectives.[6]

Surely conditions within the American public and body-politic have changed appreciably in the last ten years. Whether they have or not, world conditions have changed. If massive retaliation was to continue as the sole adopted

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[6]David S. McLellan et al., The Theory and Practice of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 144.

of war that the original strategy was designed to avoid. There is a possibility of being trapped in an insane relationship: an attempt increase, will to use strength decreases.

In America, however, predictions tend to rule out any examples that are based on the assumption that the American people will, at the most critical moment, be subject to the same kind of errors which nuclear have always been susceptible to--such as deficiencies in strategy, judgment, or reliance to maintain simplemens of purpose. There is a belief that the "Great Debaters" will work simply because it must work. David Kemelian, in his Theory and Practice of International Relations, points out that

> . . . instead of developing one military potential along diversified lines designed to contain the Soviets at a minimum cost to ourselves, we opted our military -- already upon a fleeting superiority of atomic air power which, in the end, we were unwilling to employ and which, as Korea showed, did not make us invulnerable to aggression. Military power is unusually resistant in relation to material objectives and willingness to pursue those objectives.[6]

Purely considerations within the American society and body politic have changed appreciably in the last two years. If

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[6] David S. McLellan et al., The Theory and Practice of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958), p. 142.

strategy, then the nation had to be prepared to use it. But then a country is faced with the peculiar dilemma of either having too much deterrent for a given situation, or having to resort to all-out war everytime the deterrent is exercised. Kissinger contends that this will almost inevitably operate against the side which can extricate itself from a situation only by the threat of general war.[7] Although this argument was more prevalent five years ago, it still bears heavy significance. Fortunately, it appears that the dilemma referred to is in the process of rectification. It must be assumed that this change is accompanied by a proportionately higher "will to utilize."

Before taking up military force, it should be emphasized that perhaps the important factor is not the symmetry or asymmetry of offensive power within a country, or in comparison with another country, but rather the stability of the balance between countries. Bernard Brodie has written that stability is achieved when nuclear nations believe that the strategic advantage of striking first is overshadowed by the tremendous cost of doing so.[8] The communication of intent between nations will undoubtedly assume added emphasis

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[7]Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harpers, 1957), p. 133.

[8]Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 303.

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[7] Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harpers, 1957), p. 137.

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in an attempt to maintain the all-important balance. The Washington-Moscow "hot-line," butt of cartoonist and pundit alike, is a serious example of this attempt. Also, it has been implied that the function of military force may be in the process of shifting. Future warfare may well be less a matter of raw physical force and more a contest of wills, with military power serving as a tool within a framework of bargaining and mutual concession. History will have to provide the answer as to whether or not military force will reassume this classical role. With this in mind, let us proceed to an investigation of force.

It is obvious that any study of nuclear war, regardless of scope, must include consideration of military force within the area of strategics. In addition, it provides a reference point for the analysis, in Chapter IV, of force and the new environment.

Force is the engine that propels the vehicle of war. Military force has historically performed three main functions in the process of international politics. First, it has served as an index to the power and prestige of a nation. Second, it has served as a function of negotiation. Third, it has served as a persuader in armed conflict, both as a deterrent to actual combat and as an expediter of combat. The cohesive factor that has traditionally bound these functions together and given them purpose has been the

in an attempt to maintain the alliance. The Washington-Moscow "hot-line," built at enormous cost during the Cuban crisis, is a curious example of this attempt. Also, it was been implied that the function of military force may be in the process of shifting. Future warfare may well be less a matter of the physical force and more a contest of wits, with military power employed as a tool within a framework of bargaining and mutual concession. History will have to reassume this classical role, with care in mind, lest we proceed to an intensification of force.

It is obvious that any study of nuclear war, regardless of scope, must include consideration of military force within the area of strategies. In addition, it provides a reference point for the analysis, in Chapter IV, of force and the new environment.

Force in the modern view provokes the weighing of war. Military force has historically performed three main functions in the process of international politics. First, it has served to alter the power and prestige of a nation. Second, it has served as a function of negotiation. Third, it has served to preserve an armed conflict, both by a deterrent to actual combat and as an extension of combat. The coercive factor that has traditionally bound these functions together and given them purpose now has been im

political objectives of the nation concerned; for in the final analysis, the worth or utility of military force must be measured in political terms—especially if "political" is defined as the advancing or preservation of national objectives. After all, the prime goal of a state in international politics is the survival of the state itself; therefore, military force becomes only a means and not an end.

David McLellan suggests that the political interests of victor and vanquished alike have been swept away by the destructiveness of total war, principally because of the addition of hydrogen weapons to the arsenals of war.[9] But as long as war remains a possibility in international relations, the important issue seems to be one of how much and what kind of military force is most appropriate to a nation's goals. As mentioned a moment ago, military force can serve as a deterrent to armed conflict. The prevention of such conflict certainly possesses the characteristics of a worthy political objective.

How is this military power to be measured? Three generalized criteria are obvious: (1) there must be a force available for deterring or successfully meeting any threats to the vital interests of the state; (2) there should be no doubt in the minds of others that the state has the will and

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[9]McLellan, op. cit., p. 141.

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competence to use its force effectively; and (3) there must exist a system of responsible control over the force. Despite the value in recognizing these guidelines, they do not overtly suggest the many problems involved in the creation and maintenance of a required military force in a nuclear war environment. The problems are far more complex and far less susceptible to rational postulation.

First of all, the policy-maker is confronted by an enormous range of weapons and must select the appropriate weapons systems that he feels will adequately meet all threats. This large stable of military possibilities costs money, and few nations, unless their national survival is clearly at stake, are willing to make the necessary sacrifices in order to be militarily secure. This results in a constant strain between divergent value systems. However compelling the concept of an adequate military force may be, it must be constantly weighed against correspondingly important considerations of education, health, basic scientific research, capital investment, and overall economic allocations. Furthermore, all Americans agree that the United States is a democracy—whatever the much-abused word may mean. In any case, the policy-maker cannot operate within a vacuum in this type of society. It is assumed that one of the essential elements in any democratic government is the recognition and implementation of popular attitudes. This

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is the sticky atmosphere in which the formulators of policy and the makers of decision must function. The lines of influence originate with the general public, with various interest groups, from within political parties, through the outlets of mass media, and from various elite groups. But they should all converge at a common locus. It is at this focal point that the extent of military force must be determined.

Lastly, if military force is only a means of obtaining national objectives, then what relationship—if any—do the means have in determining the ultimate goals of the state? This subject will be examined later; but in passing let it be said that it would appear meaningless, if not indicative of sheer stupidity, for a nation to develop costly strategies utilizing military force which have little or no relation to the permissible or attainable goals of national policy. If a nation is uncertain about its objectives, it can well decimate its economic viability on futile strategies that have no meaning in the real world. The dubious consequences would probably be a weakened military force and utter confusion within the nation and among allies. The assessment of military force must be carried out within the context of realistic political purposes as well as that of human values.

A quick review at this point reveals that force is related to the decision-making process and that this process

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involves selection of various modes of force in the construction of a military posture. This selective procedure is, in actuality, the crux of strategy. This chapter on nuclear war strategics, therefore, will be concluded with a discussion of strategies associated with the post-World War II period. It has been said that history is the graveyard of strategies, for man has not yet learned to master his fate. Strategies and war techniques come and go, but peace remains as elusive as ever. However, a visit to the cemetery may provide an insight or two. This particular trip will consist of a preliminary and general look at strategic planning, and then analyses of Containment, Massive Retaliation, Preventive war, and finally, Multideterrence.

The present world environment presents many complex and difficult problems with regard to the strategic implications of general war. We are not even certain that there will be a general war. But the possibility cannot be completely ignored and a long-range perspective should be applied to strategic planning. The concept of strategy was mentioned earlier when it was stated that strategy is a means of reaching certain pre-determined objectives by means of selection. There was also a suggestion that objectives will occasionally influence means. The first step in the process of strategic planning, therefore, appears to be the formulation of goals.

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The necessary relationship between fundamental decision-making and the adoption of a comprehensive strategy is indeed compounded. Aside from the direct sequence of decisions that eventually leads to the inception of a specific strategy, there are eddy currents of indirect influence; such as, physical and economic resources, science, technology, and politically-inspired opinions. But at the base of the decision-making process lies the very profound--and often very obscure--interpretation of human, moral, and religious values. Within this framework, the United States attempts to discover her national goals. On the basis of these goals, the policies determining the allocation of resources are made and followed in the sequence by the selection of a national strategy which includes foreign policy, trade policies, foreign aid, and military policy--all of which are hopelessly intertwined.

As once said, military strategy involves selection of weapons systems and forces that will best secure the objectives of the nation. This selection is based upon a variety of available systems and forces but is constrained by policy decisions responsible for the allocation of resources. The resulting interaction between national values, policy, allocation of resources, and military strategy is continuous and not without danger. The ever-changing complexion of the national environment can easily result in failure to realize

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that the enemy for which the strategy was designed also possesses national values, ideological beliefs, and general policy guidelines. There is a tendency to overlook the fact that strategy is a broad-sword capable of cutting in two directions. The importance of this horrendous metaphor lies in the fact that a nation should never settle for a short-range power or political advantage when there is a wide range of long-term choices. The risk of losing the initiative, or of being caught in an awkward or untenable military position is tremendous. It seems reasonable to predict that force of some kind will be used to resolve international issues. The United States should be careful to avoid rigid postures that invariably produce rapidly diminishing strategic flexibility. Strategic thinking and planning should not be too narrow in scope, too low in quality, nor too short-term. What have been the suggestions resulting from the "strategy-selection" process--or possibly worse yet, the positions actually adopted?

Containment: A secret memorandum forwarded to the State Department in 1946 outlined the basic elements of Containment. The following year, these same elements were published in Foreign Affairs over the signature of "Mr. X," who, as it turned out, was George Kennan, then Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Like any true declaration of strategic policy, Containment consisted of

assumptions concerning the capabilities, limitations, and intentions of the Soviet Union and the United States, suggestions for courses of action, and anticipated results.

The purpose was originally long-term, with the United States assuming a position of patient but firm vigilance that would entail persistence, flexibility, and resourcefulness in an attempt to stem Soviet expansion of influence throughout the world. There were two end-products expected: first, Containment would check Communistic influence and prevent the addition of countries to the Red bloc; second, by continually frustrating their efforts, it would force the Communists to abandon their expansive tendencies. As Kennan pointed out, political leadership cannot afford to pursue policies that continually result in frustration, the belief being, of course, that the Soviet leaders were largely instilled with political and national interests like all other politicians.

President Truman added one significant ingredient to this fundamentally political-military strategy. He gave it ideological content: the defense of liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This change in orientation from a strategy of power-versus-power to a campaign for liberty created a dilemma from which American foreign policy has not yet fully escaped.[10]

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[10]Amitai Etzioni, The Hard Way To Peace (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 21.

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[10] Walter Lippmann, The Cold War (New York:

This amendment deprived the United States of much military and political flexibility and made every piece of real estate this side of the Iron Curtain part of the American moral and military commitment. Thus, we see one of the many paradoxes that have characterized post-war and nuclear age international relations. The addition of an ideological intonation to Containment was for the purpose of strengthening the policy; the actual result was one of weakening it and causing its demise. Flexibility was transmuted into rigidity.

In addition, the means of effectuating Containment was to prove equally fatal. This was atomic bombardment. The United States assumed that the principal danger lay in the possibility of a large-scale attack by Russia on the American mainland. Such an attack, it was believed, could only be averted by the threat of atomic retaliation upon Mother Russia. It took the Korean War, as well as the Greek civil war, to drive the lesson home: the real danger was not an attack directly on the United States. France's humiliation in Indochina provided the second lesson: atomic bombing was not an effective way to "contain" Communism. The United States was to turn, as this narrative is about to do, to the strategy of Massive Retaliation.

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Massive Retaliation: It is usually agreed that the shortcomings of containment were dramatized during the Korean

War by the conflict between President Truman and General Douglas MacArthur. The basic argument has been aired frequently, often inconclusively; and although Truman's adherence to the general policy of Containment prevailed, the strategy emerged from Korea severely wounded and proved to be the crisis out of which the subsequent policy of Massive Retaliation was to arise.

The 1953 inauguration of a Republican administration resulted in the appointment of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State. It was Dulles, with the passive support of President Eisenhower and the active support of Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who formulated the new American strategy. The heart of this policy can best be described in Secretary Dulles' own words:

> (the new policy is to depend) . . . primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing. Now the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our military establishment to fit what is our policy, instead of having to try to be ready to meet the enemy's many choices. That permits a selection of military means instead of a multiplication of means. As a result, it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at less cost.[11]

Massive Retaliation, according to Dulles, would be effective, economical, and morally superior to Containment. It would not allow an enemy to escape without risk or without

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punishment. The focal point of the new policy was deterrence. Theoretically, it forced potential aggressors to cope with the "cost-risk equation." They would not be stopped by a row of machine guns in trenches, but by a psychological barrier.[12] The advantages of the "New Look" appeared clear: (1) it provided the United States with flexibility and concentrated power--both familiar to military scientists; (2) it provided "more bang for the buck"; (3) it conformed to the historic American pattern of "aggressor punishment"; and (4) it provided hope for those under Communist domination; for if and when Red power was broken through nuclear bombing, countries behind the Iron Curtain would be liberated. In fact, Massive Retaliation only had one disadvantage: it did not work. It received its major test only one year after the Korean armistice was signed and was found to be less than adequate. The year 1954 not only marked the French loss in Indochina, after French appeals to the United States, but the fact that a war started in Indochina in the first place meant that Massive Retaliation had failed to deter, the very thing it was designed to do best--not to mention "rolling back," "liberation," or "punishment." At the same time, the American monopoly on hydrogen weapons was broken and the Russian stockpile of atomic weapons reached a point

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[12]Etzioni, op. cit., p. 26.

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[12] Truman, op. cit., p. 76.

of near-parity with the United States, both in numbers and in delivery methods. In any event, the strategy of Massive Retaliation was to remain, to a major degree, the basic orientation of American defense policy until the early 1960's, and its remnants are still embedded within the policy structure.

Preventive war: The concept of nuclear war and the disadvantages of Containment and Massive Retaliation has led to the consideration---at least by a few---of a provocative strategy that should be included in this discussion of nuclear war strategies. It is unlikely that it will ever become an active "expression of will," but the logic has a magnetic quality. It is the strategy of Preventive war. What may appear to be undue emphasis in relation to the two previously-mentioned strategies is the result of fascination and the belief that it is less familiar.

As mentioned earlier, preventive attack refers to a premeditated assault by one country upon another during a period of relative calm or absence of crisis. The resulting aftermath would be Preventive war. Refinement of this is possible by reading Bernard Brodie's explanation. He writes that preventive strategy consists of ". . . a premeditated attack by one country against another which is unprovoked in the sense that it does not wait upon a specific aggression

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or other overt action by the target state."[13] The strategy of Preventive war, as a distinct possibility, has unceremoniously died, assuming, of course, that it once had life. Only a small core of earnest adherents guard the grave. Pressures in favor of the idea diminished as the Soviet Union developed their nuclear capability and as the United States adapted to the environment of the nuclear age. Nevertheless, Preventive war remains as a theoretical alternative for the strategy-makers, and the premises and logic behind it deserve at least a cursory examination.

The argument for Preventive war is rather simple. It rests primarily upon four assumptions: (1) the initiating country's defensive capability lags behind its offensive capability in effectiveness; (2) no technological improvements are foreseen that would substantially alter the above; (3) total war is inevitable; and (4) the country that hits first in the inevitable war enjoys a decisive advantage. It is rather obvious that the nation seizing the initiative in a situation such as this would stand an excellent chance of either destroying an opponent's retaliatory capability or of disorganizing it to such an extent that the residue could be easily handled. The objectives are equally plain. The initiating nation believes--and with reasonable assuredness--

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[13] Brodie, op. cit., p. 27.

that it would be able to minimize the amount of damage that it would receive while at the same time smashing the machinery of the enemy's military organization and breaking the will of the target nation's people. This would then approximate the more classical meaning of military victory.

The basic premise in the argument for Preventive war is the inevitability of total war. This attitude represents one end of the "spectrum of possibility," and a current attitude popular among many falls at the other end of the scale: the impossibility of total war. Unfortunately, this latter view is no more defensible than the first. Even if it could be proven that total war is not inevitable or even likely to occur, which it cannot, general war might still erupt. Rational decision-makers could start a total war if they believed that there existed an advantage in striking first, and irrational decision-makers would need no justification at all. But realistic analysis of the "strategic balance" between the major nuclear powers reveals one pertinent point that makes the possibility of nuclear war academic. That is this: "nuclear stalemate" implies a degree of equilibrium, not only in weapon delivery systems, but in weapon-alert systems as well. In order for one power to launch effectively a first-strike against the other it must try and achieve maximum surprise in its pre-launch activities. This would surely result in something less than a full operational

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launch. The resulting damage of this truncated blow would not be of sufficient magnitude to eliminate a retaliatory blow from the target nation. The conclusion that may be drawn is clear. There could be no conclusive victory. The absence of decisive victory in one important criteria for "nuclear stalemate"; thus, the argument comes full circle.

Reviewing this strategy for its applicability, it would superficially appear that the United States is militarily best prepared for the kind of war most inconsistent with its values, traditions, and policies: a surprise attack against the Soviet Union; and yet, Preventive war is considered much too immoral for Americans to contemplate seriously. Apart from this consideration, the military case against Preventive war must be re-evaluated. First, there is the condition of "nuclear stalemate." The physical circumstances of this phenomenon significantly detracts from the advantages of striking first. This was exposed in the preceding paragraph. Secondly, it would be the height of presumptuousness to undertake such cataclysmic action as preventive attack based on the thesis that total war is inevitable. Although total war may not be impossible, it certainly possesses a low degree of probability. In spite of its fascinating characteristics, Preventive war would appear to be too impractical, immoral, implausible, and imbecilic.

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Multideterrence: Multideterrence has been advocated for years by various experts, especially members of RAND Corporation, a research center ironically subsidized by the Air Force. As was mentioned in Chapter I, Multideterrence is the possession of a force so designed as to counter every sort of threat an enemy might make. According to authorities of the subject, the list of necessary, and minimum, prerequisites for effective Multideterrence is as follows:[14]

1. Nuclear weapons—nuclear weapons have to be employed in order to prevent an enemy, who also has such weapons, from using them or threatening with them.

2. Limited war capability—conventional arms should be extensive in quantity and diversified in purpose so that minor provocations can be countered without resort to nuclear bombardment.

3. Net striking force—in essence, it is not the size of a nation's nuclear or conventional stockpile that counts, but the number of bombs, rockets, bullets, missiles, or even rocks that can actually be dropped, fired, or thrown upon enemy targets. In short, a nation can retaliate only with the force that will survive after it has endured an attack. An effective net striking force requires a wide variety of weapons systems. The power of any single system,

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[14] Ibid., pp. 14-31.

whether it is Polaris submarines, Minuteman missiles, or B-70 jet bombers, could be neutralized by an enemy. In addition, hardening and mobility of launching sites is considered highly desirable under the terms of Multideterrence. Polaris submarines and carrier task forces possess mobility and missile sites can be hardened, but just how one hardens or provides mobility to 10,000-foot jet runways is an interesting question.

4. Insurance against the unknown--it is proposed that weapons systems not currently feasible--or called for--be researched and developed. Production could occur when the need for these systems becomes evident.[15]

5. Civil defense--civil defense could serve two purposes. First, as suggested, deterrence can fail. General war may break out and a well-developed civil defense would reduce the losses. Second, civil defense an be viewed as a central element of deterrence itself. The inadequacy with which a population is protected is more likely to offer a poor "credibility posture" to a potential aggressor.

As illustrated by point number two of these prerequisites, Multideterrence is more than a nuclear strategy.

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[15]The reconciliation of this prerequisite with current economic policies within the Department of Defense offers an interesting case study in problem-solving.

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[15] The recommendation of this corresponds with current thinking within the Department of Defense although no [illegible] has been made.

It is generally considered to have three fundamental themes; viz., deterrence of aggression; freedom for the President to select and apply the amount and kind of force appropriate to the threat at hand; and third, the controlled use of force.[16] Rather than American defense being predicated upon the "spasm" of Massive Retaliation (sometimes referred to as the "knee-jerk" response), present policies stress options, flexibility, deliberation, and control. Multideterrence, therefore, is the current strategy. It consists of nuclear strategy, conventional strategy, and passive defense strategy. Officially, at least, it is a strategy of choice; a strategy of flexible response.

What may be said in reviewing this section and its theme of nuclear war strategics? The topics of deterrence and military force have been discussed, and the post-war strategies of the United States were presented in a distilled and somewhat descriptive manner. In summary:

1. It has been said that deterrence is the negative aspect of political power where a premium is placed on dissuasion rather than coercion. Power, however, is an important part of deterrence, for it takes power and its implied utilization to dissuade effectively. In addition, successful

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[16]Alain C. Enthoven, "U.S. Defense - Policy for the 1960's," speech delivered at Loyola University, Los Angeles, February 10, 1963.

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deterrence requires a willingness to use power and a valid evaluation of deterrent capabilities and intentions by the party being deterred. The latter, along with various predetermined values, form the major inputs to the "cost-risk equation." Both parties involved with this equation should strive for a minimization of cost and risk with a maximization of gain. The planning of a deterred force should also include an appreciation for the economics involved in the design and operation of that force. A successful deterrent should involve "low cost-high gain" with regard to expenditures and systems utilized.

2. Military force---the power of deterrence---has three classical roles: a power and prestige index; a function of negotiation; and it serves as a persuader in war. It was stated that the cohesive factor has traditionally been the political objectives of the state. The nuclear environment, however, complicates the classical role of force. Those responsible for strategy selection must consider the wide range of "force-types" available and decide upon the one, or combination of two or more, that will provide the most appropriate response or posture to a given situation. In addition, a democratic society requires that its attitudes be implemented whenever and wherever possible. These attitudes spring from various sources within the American public, but it is the unenviable task of the decision-makers

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and the need for public support. Thus it is the executive

to recognize an overall public attitude and then feed it into the force-selection process. It was finally concluded that military force is related to the decision-making process and that this process involves the selection of various kinds of force; i.e., "force-types." This procedure of selection is the crux of strategy.

3. What about specific strategies? Those mentioned were Containment, Massive Retaliation, Preventive war, and Multideterrence.

a. It was originally hoped that Containment would check the spread of Communist influence and result in frustration within the Soviet leadership. The defense of liberty was added to this otherwise political and military strategy, thus giving the entire policy an ideological flavoring. But Containment proved to be paradoxical. Shot through with ideological [illegible]eachments, the strategy ossified into a brittle shell. The transformation into Massive Retaliation occurred, coincidentally but not accidentally, following the Korean war and with the ascension of John Foster Dulles to the office of Secretary of State.

b. Massive Retaliation was considered more efficient, more economical, and morally superior. It supposedly marked the return to flexibility and was designed to allow the United States to capitalize upon its great deterrent power: the Hydrogen bomb and an assortment of lesser atomic weapons.

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Unfortunately, the Soviets selected Massive Retaliation's natal year as the year to explode their first thermonuclear device, and were soon on a par with the United States in the sense that each could virtually annihilate the other.

c. The fascinating theory of Preventive war was discussed, although it has never been an official defense policy. The fundamental premise in the logic of Preventive war is a belief in the inevitability of nuclear war. In order to gain and maintain the initiative in such a war, one nuclear nation decides to attack its most likely enemy. It was concluded, however, that Preventive war in the environment of "nuclear stalemate" would produce indecisive victory, if victory at all. Also, total war, although not impossible, certainly possesses a low degree of probability.

d. Finally, the strategy of Multideterrence was mentioned. This type of strategy places emphasis on the capability of neutralizing threats of all descriptions and includes nuclear power, conventional power, a "net striking force," insurance against the unknown (research and development), and strong civil defense. In essence, it is a strategy of flexible response, and comes reasonably close to providing the blueprint from which the current American defense structure was built.

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CHAPTER III

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW ENVIRONMENT

Preceding emphasis has been directed toward the development of nuclear war as a possibility of international politics, and the strategics of this possibility. The intended purpose has been to create a minimum foundation for the eventual discussion of force and strategy within a new international environment. The tactics utilized have brought the study up to but not into this environment. The time for penetration has now arrived. By completing the preliminary framework--that is, the significant ideological, political, and strategic factors contributing to the environment--the mustering of forces for the attack will be accomplished.

The methodology of this particular chapter will consist of a brief discussion of the cold war, which will omit historical narrative and concentrate instead upon the fundamental characteristics of its post-war development. The United States and Russia will then be treated individually so that a better understanding of their significant motives for seeking a different system of relations will be realized; and finally, focus will be placed on the actual "arrival" of the new environment.

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World politics since 1945 have revolved primarily around the conflict between the Free World system and its

assortment of allies and near-allies and the Soviet Union and its various "satellites." This confrontation has been largely a continuation of the war that the Bolsheviks declared on the non-Bolshevik world in 1917, but following the termination of World War II, the conflict assumed added intensity as a result of the increased power of the Soviet Union. In the process, the Soviets transformed and assembled eastern Europe into an economically and ideologically dependent area. They also contributed to the Communist victory in China in 1949 and, in turn, helped lay the basis for Communist infiltration from China into Southeast Asia. The United States, immediately after the war, typically returned her collective rifle to its honored place over the fireplace. But she soon undertook a frantic rearmament program; formed military alliances all over the world; and extended billions of dollars for military and economic aid to countries that leaders in the American government believed must be defended from the expansive tendencies of Communism. Thus, the cold war became a political conflict of the most intense sort. It involved struggling between governments for objectives in which the opposing sides employed various political, economic, and psychological methods, but for the most part, did not resort to large-scale military operations. This soon became one of the cardinal rules of the game. In some instances, the opponents engaged in non-conventional warfare

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and even made limited use of regular troops, but the rule of "limited military hostility" was generally observed. Actually, this form of conflict was not especially unique; often in history, countries vied with one another in the pursuit of goals without resort to the utilization of armed force. What characterized the political machinations of the cold war was the scope of the arena, the stakes, the combination of instruments, and the way in which the instruments were or were not used.

As the American reaction to the Soviet threat crystallized, the strategic configuration of the political, economic, and military forces in the world, in which there were just two major centers of power: the United States and the Soviet Union, evolved into a bipolar arrangement. International relations from 1945 until about 1955 were to be governed by the dynamics of this bipolarity. Books have been written concerning the traits or dynamics of this phase of the cold war; however, the following six characteristics should provide an adequate illustration of the nature of the cold war from 1945 until the first half of Eisenhower's second administration.

1. Universality. The term as used here describes the goal of both the United States and the USSR: the expansion of power and influence to every government and area of the world. In actuality, this was an attempt to solidify

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1. Inflexibility. The term as used here describes the goal of both the United States and the USSR: the expansion of power and influence to every continent and area of the world. In actuality, this was an attempt to solidify

the bipolar aspects of the conflict, a situation that both major powers understood and were willing to pursue. Charles Lerche refers to this objective of universality as the "elimination of power vacuums," where much of Southeast Asia, China, Korea, Germany, and the Middle East served as the principal battlegrounds.[1] Both Washington and Moscow enlisted aid in each of the contested areas and fought their battle through these proxies. Perhaps the only notable "losses" were China--to Communism--and Tito's defection from the Stalinist camp. Others like Greece and Iran, were saved for the West. In essence, universality, or universalism in the cold war context, was the attempted elimination of neutrals.

2. Political ideology. Systems of beliefs held by political groups are often adopted in order to justify governmental or national behavior. By the same token, governmental behavior patterns are occasionally molded after the precepts of a given ideology. Many people have viewed the cold war as solely an ideological conflict: Communism versus Freedom--whatever that term may mean. Pure and simple politics are either played down or discounted altogether. It is true that the Soviet Union possesses a highly-developed ideology that is presented as the belief of the

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[1]Charles Lerche, Foreign Policy of the American People (second edition; Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 297.

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Russian people, and surely many of the fundamental tenets of that ideology are considered inviolate by the Soviet leadership; however, some of the secondary doctrines, such as the need for violent revolution or the inevitability of war, can and are manipulated and altered to serve political ends or national interest. And yet the opponents of Communism consider it to be a solid and psuedo-religious doctrine. By contrast, the non-Communist world, or perhaps we should say the non-Soviet world, possesses many diverse ideologies. This diversity stems not only from the variety of the peoples involved, but also from the unwillingness of the leaders in the United States to compel adherence to any one system of thought--unless it is one of anti-Communism. In any event, this "ideological" cast has been an important characteristic of the cold war. In this respect, at least, the USSR managed a certain and somewhat dubious advantage over the West.

3. Interventionism. Interventionism in international politics consists of the efforts by the government of one country to alter the attitudes of behavior of the government in another country. The Soviet tools of intervention have frequently, and quite often effectively, been utilized in pursuit of "Soviet universality." The United States has suffered numerous handicaps in such activities. For one, American tradition operates against intervention into the domestic politics of other countries, particularly countries

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in Europe. However, American intervention into the affairs of Latin American nations has been rather consistent, both in terms of frequency and in terms of limited success. But were not the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine forms of intervention? This question may be answered by the proposition that the United States did not require extensive alterations in the domestic affairs of the recipient states, but one wonders if intervention does not include influence over foreign affairs, a fact in the operations of the United States and one difficult to refute. The point remains that the United States has practiced intervention in defense of its cold war position.

4. Economic competition. Economic competition is one of the oldest forms of non-military warfare. Usually, economic competition has involved struggles for sources of raw materials and commercial markets. Such activities have been shaded occasionally by political overtones, but the primary source of motivation traditionally has been the power of the commercial dollar. Strangely enough, the economic activities of the cold war have been dominated by political considerations and have even been conducted at a net monetary loss. But the Soviets and Americans have relentlessly doled out grants, loans, and technical aid in their attempt to win allies. This, it should be noted, marked a drastic about-face for the USSR. Marxist theory

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holds that communist revolutions erupt as a result of worker poverty. It would appear to be a case of ideology being altered to fit the political facts of life.

5. Transformation of diplomatic techniques. One of the chief aims of diplomacy has historically been the settlement of problems between governments by means of compromise, and this function, as well as others of diplomacy, have normally been conducted in a state of at least semi-secrecy--that is until the cold war. This odd conflict, odd in many ways, resulted in a form of public diplomacy where the various media of public information possessed a vested interest in the mechanics of negotiation as well as in its results. The forum of the United Nations undoubtedly contributed to this practice of "Wilsonian diplomacy." In addition, the aims of diplomacy were changed. No longer was compromise necessarily an objective; but rather heads of government, utilizing the public nature of cold war diplomacy, used this method to express the position of their government on a particular issue. This was utilized by governments to garner support from their own peoples as well as the support of allies and possible allies. As a result, when leaders wished actually to compromise, their publics, which had been introduced to the issues in public debate, often expressed a desire to remain inflexible. In the "land of diversified ideologies," this can prove embarrassing. It cannot be

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the form of the United Nations unexpectedly contributed to
in the acceptance of negotiation as well as in its results.
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sis," resulted in a form of public diplomacy where the secr-
that is until the cold war. This odd conflict, odd in many
normally been conducted in a state of at least semi-secrecy--
and this function, as well as others of diplomacy, have
ment of problems between governments by means of compromise.
the chief aim of diplomacy has historically been the settle-

5. Transformation of diplomatic techniques. One of
sitered to it the political basis of life.
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maintained that the results are always disadvantageous, but political leaders certainly encounter more difficulty in conducting foreign policy, a fact manifested in the negotiations for disarmament, German unification, and the status of Berlin.

6. Agreement to disagree. Regardless of the issue or issues involved, the rules of the cold war made it axiomatic that United States and Soviet positions should be diametrically opposed. Such opposition did not incorporate any real hope by either party that it might persuade the other, or win any victories; rather the agreement to disagree was indicative of the totality of the early cold war.[2]

What may be said then, in form of review, of the conduct and factors of the cold war up until about 1955? Chronologically, the flow was something like this: following World War II, a strengthened Soviet Union commenced to expand its influence. The United States hastily began rearming and responded to the Soviet strategy with the strategic posture of Containment. The Truman Doctrine was applied in Greece, and Containment was given an ideological cloak. The Marshall Plan in Europe soon followed, and the revival of the continent was commenced. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed as a military alliance, German

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recovery and rearmament was witnessed, and Europe was well on her way to some type of integration. In the interim, the Russians exploded their own atomic device, and there was evidence to indicate that the Soviets were shifting their attention to the Far East. China fell into the hands of Mao Tse-tung, and the Korean war was fought to an inconclusive termination. As a result of this "police action," doubts were cast upon the American strategy of Containment, and was accompanied by a new administration in the White House. John Foster Dulles and the strategy of Massive Retaliation came to the fore, but the Indochinese War and the explosion of Russia's first thermonuclear device made Massive Retaliation appear weakest in the very thing it was supposed to do best--deter. The entire pattern of events from 1945-1947 until 1954-1955 was marked by certain characteristics. First, the cold war was a political and ideological war. The two super-powers, by means of political and ideological arguments, economic competition, and open intervention attempted to eliminate all power vacuums in the world. There were to be no neutrals. Either a government was for the freedom of mankind or he was against it. There was a clearly understood agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union as to what constituted the proper rules of the game. What one was for, the other was against. This was total bipolarity. Diplomacy became an open discussion of issues and a sounding board for the expression of

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But by 1955, the complexion of the environment was changing. Bipolarity was beginning to break down. Europe was resurgent, China was bellicose and fervent, nationalism and neutralism was on the rise with almost uncontrollable force, and both the United States and the Soviet Union began to realize that their nuclear power was slowly losing utility in the evolving environment. They were capable of destroying each other, but ironically could not. Others realized this. The old rules of the cold war were no longer applicable.

Basic changes have occurred in history before. One hundred years of devastating war--as total as possible at that time--taught both Catholics and Protestants in Europe that neither could beat the other. Christianity and Islam have co-existed, fitfully, as two missionary faiths each claiming to be universal. Yet finally, each had to realize the inconvenient fact that neither could destroy the other. In 1955, perhaps the same compulsion existed. It certainly was not a case of lacking capacity, but rather a case of

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having too much. "Destructive equality" had arrived. It was perhaps appreciated that diplomacy would have to remain flexible; mutual relations would have to remain fluid so that the irresistible force would not meet the immovable object.

At this point, the study will treat the Soviet Union and the United States separately in order to better understand the roots of the new environment--an environment of required flexibility; an environment of nuclear irrelevance and political importance. There appears to be more than just equality of arms responsible for this condition.

Soviet Union

A basic contention of this study is that the Soviet Union welcomes a new environment in the conduct of international relations. The reasons for this welcoming were born of necessity. Without laboring the point, let it be repeated that one of the two fundamental explanations for Soviet desires for a new form of relations was nuclear parity with the United States. By 1955, the Soviet government had possession of thermonuclear weapons and had developed a sufficient number of delivery techniques to convince the United States of a credible capability in case of nuclear war. But perhaps equally important is the argument of practical politics--or if you wish, national interest. The foundation of this argument will now be examined in more

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detail. It involves the fragmentation of the world Communist movement.

The "communist bloc" that welcomed Mao Tse-tung's Chinese People's Republic into their fold on October 1, 1949, was not as solid and homogeneous as many would believe. Stresses and strains were present, the majority of which were attributable to differences in historical and national backgrounds, pre-revolutionary social and economic development, elementary geography, and conflicting ambitions. Into this environment came a government led by a group of men sincerely inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideas, who, for twenty years, had been fighting for their lives, territory, and control. They owed their victory to strength, ruthlessness, and resolution. There was no reason to believe that the addition of Red China would accomplish more than to attenuate the stresses and strains already at work.

From this time until after the death of Stalin in 1953, relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese government were occasionally uneasy but never difficult. Both countries were concerned primarily with the economic recovery necessitated by World War II and with consolidation of their respective gains. Following the enigmatic demise of Stalin, and during the power struggle that resulted within the Kremlin walls, it was imperative that the Communist world reflect a monolithic appearance. But pressure was mounting

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within China, and after Khrushchev's successful clamber to the top of the Soviet pile in 1955-1956, the first thrusts of confrontation began to take definite form.

Professed authorities on Sino-Soviet affairs speculate and differ as to the exact time and place of active disagreement between Moscow and Peking. They all seem to agree, however, that it was Khrushchevian policies promulgated upon his ascension to power that provided the proper stimulus. It is reasoned that any man with less authority than Stalin who attempted to control the Soviet giant as did Stalin himself would have fought a hopeless political battle. Control would go to the man who promised much and gave little. That man was Nikita Khrushchev. And this is really the crux of this discussion, which in turn hopefully provides understanding as to why the Soviet Union desires changes in the conduct of world politics. Khrushchev is a practical politician. He is concerned above all with making things work in such a way as to conserve his own power and further the glory of Mother Russia, and less concerned with ultimate aims or militant Leninism. Perhaps the first real blow at the Chinese, and the first real indication of the beginning of the new environment, occurred in early 1956. The occasion of February, 1956, was the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The most spectacular aspect of this meeting was Soviet denunciation of Joseph

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Stalin, but something else occurred at the Congress even more important in the long run than the attack on Stalin. Khrushchev proclaimed two radical amendments to the Leninist canon:

1. A negative interpretation of the inevitability of war.
2. A negative interpretation of the necessity for violent revolution.

Edward Crankshaw writes that the logic of these pronouncements is quite clear when analyzed from the standpoint of Khrushchev as a practical politician.[3] Nuclear war could cripple or destroy the Soviet Union; therefore, it would be foolish to continue the advocacy of inevitable war. The fostering of revolution through violent means could lead to local war, which could easily develop into a major nuclear conflagration; therefore, other means must be developed for extending Communist influence. Although differences with Communist China may have provided Russia with the excuse for denouncing two basic elements of Communist ideology, the fact remains that she did--which illustrates what was said earlier with regard to molding or altering an ideology to fit political or nationalistic objectives. In any event, by 1955-1956,

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[3]Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow vs. Pekin (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 81.

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we can assume that the Soviet Union was willing to explore new methods of conducting the cold war.[4]

To attribute Russian desires for some type of detente with the West almost solely to the polemics of Communist politics, as the emphasis of the last few paragraphs would seem to indicate, would be an exercise in absurdity. This was undoubtedly among the major if not the most important factor; however, other considerations must be mentioned for the sake of balanced perspective.

The curious European renaissance of power surely played its part. Not only was the political power of Western Europe on the rise by 1955, but European industry and wealth were also ascending. In addition, West Germany was admitted into the councils of NATO in 1954. The fact remains obvious, however, that despite these various developments they all presented more of a danger to Russian political or national interest than they did to the ideological concept of Communism.

United States

As mentioned, the steady accretion of Russian atomic and hydrogen weapons, accompanied by demonstrated progress

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in the development of delivery systems, brought about a global "balance of terror." In 1945, the United States was the undisputed, and the undisputable, leader of the free world. By the mid-fifties this leadership may have been still undisputed, but it was no longer undisputable. Whereas the "balance of terror" may well have been accidentally coincident with the Khrushchevian realization of Russian national interests, the same balance brought home to Americans the perils of their historic and dichotomous interpretation of war and peace; of force and diplomacy. The fundamental problem of the United States had become one of professed strategic posture. The United States had become increasingly fearful of employing its military power in answer to Communist challenges.

As long as its military power was concentrated in readiness to the call of Massive Retaliation, the dilemma confronting the free world coalition led by the United States was twofold: it could seek to meet localized aggression where it occurred on the basis of almost certain military inferiority; or it could bring its overwhelming strategic air and missile power into play—and rightfully expect full retaliation. Diplomatically, these two alternatives reduced themselves to settling for a negotiated peace, like the <u>status quo ante bellum</u> in Korea, or of a disadvantageous settlement as in Indochina. Or, by relying upon

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nuclear devastation, diplomatic negotiation would become academic. Both alternatives presented serious drawbacks. The United States, therefore, was presented with the equally unpalatable options of localized "appeasement" or worldwide holocaust.

For almost ten years, the United States held either an atomic monopoly or a far superior capacity to deliver its atomic and hydrogen bombs. As we have seen, the Russians did not explode their first atomic device until 1949, and their long-range air capability was not fully developed until after the Indochina crisis of 1954. But the United States could not utilize her superior strategic power to influence the world political situation. She could not even deter the Russians from constant probing actions. And yet, the reliance upon atomic superiority and the renounced use of force except in retaliation against direct attack was the adopted American position. The "balance of terror" left the United States with no alternative but to seek a new operational and conceptual environment for international relations. Atomic monopoly was no longer a valid criterion for strategic planning, and yet a type of paralysis gripped the American conceptual apparatus. John Spanier has said that it was "characteristic of Americans in the early 1950's . . . that at the time the Russians shot their first Sputnik

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into space, the Ford Motor Company produced the new Edsel automobile."[5]

Regardless of the world situation in general, the significant forces at work within the internal structures of the two super-powers would have eventually influenced their external behavior. The resulting arena of world politics would have probably differed very little from what exists today. But American and Russian internal forces were not solely responsible for the new environment; and whether or not the current situation would have developed without these pressures is, in the final analysis, a moot point. The relevant consideration is that other dynamics were operative by 1955, and contributed to--if not accelerated--the development of the contemporary state of world politics. These factors were "new nationalism" and the attendant phenomenon of neutralism. This awakening of the vast continents of Africa and Asia truly helped to revolutionize international affairs and countered all post-war tendencies toward bi-polarism.

After 1955 old empires, subjected to unprecedented pressures, began to crumble. In a somewhat orderly transition, with the exception of Indochina, the regions of South and Southeast Asia achieved self-determination. By the

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[5]John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 206-207.

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After 1955 the emphasis, subjected to unprecedented pressures, began to change. In a somewhat orderly sequence of neutralism, caged by fear of Indochina, the regimes of South Asia and Africa truly helped to revolutionize international politics.

Although the Bandung Conference of 1955 was the first major attempt to counteract the bi-polar tendencies toward neutralism. This weakening of the vast continents of Africa and Asia truly helped to revolutionize international politics. Three factors were "new nationalism" and the attendant phenomenon by 1955, and contributed to--if not accelerated--the development of the contemporary state of world politics. These relevant consideration is that other dynamics were operative because is, in the final analysis, a moot point. The not the current situation would have developed without these socialy responsible ice the new environment; and whether or today. But American and Russian ingenual forces were not would have probably differed very little from more explicit cultural polarity. The resulting arena of world politics the two arbet-powers would have eventually influenced their significant forces at work within the internal structures of regardless of the world situation in general, the

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outbreak of the Korean War, over six hundred million people achieved dubious independence. The aftermath, unfortunately, was not as orderly as the transition. Unleashed emotions threatened to tear down all imperial vestiges. People were convinced that their backwardness and grinding poverty resulted from mis-rule by former colonial administrators. The "revolution of rising expectations" was under way.

In a world of unprecedented political and ideological conflict, Asian and African nationalism was neither left nor right in its orientation. What the new nations required was time and opportunity to establish viable political and economic organizations. In retrospect, it appears that opportunity was more available than time. Sophisticated national leaders quickly discovered that the United Nations provided an excellent forum in which to express desires--the expression of which soon became disproportionate to power and responsibility. In addition, it was soon realized that the cold war provided an opportunity to play one major power against the other, which became, for many, a game of "nonalignment."

For the new nations of Africa and Asia, the great problem of the early fifties was to sustain their struggle for equality without becoming committed to the cold war. Always seeking political or ideological advantage, the United States and Russia invariably intervened in every

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upheaval. Self-determination was usually the loser. American efforts to preserve the status quo, along with Russia's encouragement of revisionism, resulted in a wide variety of involvements for both parties. The United States persisted in defining the cold war on moral and global terms, completely underestimating revolutionary fervor or confusing it with ideological inclinations detrimental to God, liberty, and mass production. America could not seem to understand that the emerging nations had interests and ambitions quite separate from those of the United States and Russia. It was, in fact, the arrival of this "third force" that spelled the end for the bipolar concept and marked the beginning of the new environment. This new context was not only characterized by nuclear stalemate between the atomic Goliaths, but was also identified by the proliferation of many political Davids.

The new environment was thus conceived by the practical politics of Russia and the strategic implausibility of the United States. Its birth was induced by the forces of nationalism and non-alignment. It was not only marked by "destructive equality," but provided for what Charles Lerche calls the "renaissance of flexibility."[6] In conclusion, a brief look at Professor Lerche's evaluation of this

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development appears fruitful:

> The super-powers themselves recognized the extent to which they had lost their once-exclusive ability to control world politics. Partly because of the increasing determination of other states to make their own way, and partly because of the serious inhibitions military stalemate imposed on national policies, the Soviet and the United States toned down both the intensity and the dimensions of the cold war. Their relative positions did not appreciably change, and the issues between them remained as numerous and as difficult as ever; both realized, however, that uncomplicated total opposition has no outcome but futility, and both became aware that other issues demanding solution could no longer be ignored.[7]

The death of bipolarity indeed marked a fundamental change in the scheme of things. The real importance, however, seems to lie in the fact that bipolarity cannot be reimposed. There would appear to be no technical, psychological, or political method for attaining it again. It is truly a new environment--not a passing event. It is a new environment in which many myths, traditions, and policies (often one in the same) must be re-evaluated. The former lines of demarcation outlining the arena of the cold war no longer exist. The cold war context of pre-1955 is no longer relevant, although it has been observed to one degree or another in the last eight years. New direction and purpose must stem from recognition of this new environment.

Nuclear war and its strategics, naturally including force and strategy as considerations, were vital traits of

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[7] Ibid.

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The super-powers themselves recognized the extent to which they had lost their once-exclusive ability to control world politics. Partly because of the increasing self-confirmation of other centers to make their own way, and partly because of the evident ambivalence of military statesmanship on nuclear policies, the Soviet and the United States found down both the internally and the diversions of the cold war. Their relative positions did not appreciably change, and the issues between them remained as murderous and as difficult to overcome as ever. Both realized, however, that uncomplicated total opposition was no outcome--but flexibility, and both became aware that other ways of developing solution could be imagined.

The death of bipolarity indeed marked a fundamental change in the volume of things. The real importance, however, seemed to lie in the fact that bipolarity cannot be resumed. There would appear to be no technical, psychological, or political method for attaining it again. It is truly a new environment--not a passing event. It is a new environment in which many myths, traditions, and policies [illegible] under the same mode of re-evaluation. The former [illegible] of deterrence with [illegible] the cards of the cold war no longer exist. The [illegible] of 1989-91 is no longer relevant, even if one can observe to the degree to [illegible] [illegible] may survive.

the early phases of the cold war. What are the roles of force and strategy in the new environment that has been discussed? That investigation will be the objective of the next two succeeding chapters. Before continuing, let us briefly recapitulate the substance of this segment of the study.

1. An extremely brief resumé of the cold war was intended to reveal two points. One concerned the nature of the conflict; it was--and to a lesser extent perhaps still is--a political confrontation. The second objective concerned the resulting influence on international relations; from the end of World War II until the middle of the 1950's the cold war produced a bipolar arrangement in the world structure.

2. The characteristics, or dynamics, of this bipolar struggle were reduced into six principal categories:

a. Universality--the goal of both great powers was the expansion of influence into every possible government and area of the globe. This was referred to as the elimination of power vacuums and solidification of the bipolar concept.

b. Political ideology--the expansive tendencies of the Russians were cloaked in their professed ideology of Communism, which perhaps is not as inflexible as many would believe. The "loyal opposition" possessed many ideologies,

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2. The characteristics, or dynamics, of this bipolar structure were reduced into six principal categories:

a. Ultimate--the goal of both great powers was the dilemma of avoiding into every possible combatment and area on the globe. This was referred to as the diplomacy of peace maneuvers and militarization of the bipolar tension.

b. Ideological--the competing ideologies

c. The [illegible] theory

d. [illegible]

e. [illegible]

f. [illegible]

a diversity of beliefs. A basic tenet of the cold war was that the battle was fought in the name of ideology. Little or no attention was overtly paid to national interest or to the political objectives involved.

c. Interventionism--this consisted of the efforts taken by both powers in their attempts to alter the behavioral attitudes of governments both in and outside of the bipolar structure.

d. Economic competition--another tool utilized by Russia and the United States in their struggle to win friends and influence people was the disbursement of financial aid. Although a new undertaking for Russia, the extending of loans, grants, and assistance was made to all who, at any given time, were considered targets of the "ideological" battle.

e. Transformation of diplomacy--the traditional techniques of diplomatic relations and compromise were drastically altered into a forum of open debate in order to advance or publicize the governmental positions of the countries involved.

f. Agreement to disagree--it became axiomatic that United States and Russian positions should be diverse on all issues. If fate or interest resulted in congruent positions by both countries, it was difficult to separate embarrassment from frustration.

3. The breakdown of bipolarity can be traced to the period of 1955-1956. The study treated the two super-powers individually; Russia's prime motivations for seeking a new form of relationship stemming from practical politics of Khrushchev, as well as Russian nationalism; the United States motivations consisted of strategic imposition and the continued pursuit of questionable policies. At this point let it be said that it seems ironic that the United States ignored the principle of self-determination in Asia and Africa, where it might have enjoyed an element of success, and promoted it behind the Iron Curtain where it had virtually no chance of success. But too often, Americans have behaved as if Communism were the host rather than the parasite of change.[8] In any event, the rise of nationalism and accompanying neutralism that commenced in the post-war years and began effectively to manifest itself in the 1955-1956 period exerted a tremendous influence on the overall conduct of international relations. The United Nations became a forum for the emerging nations, and a gradual but undeniable shift in the locus of power occurred within the councils of the organization. This only illustrates the extent to which the two major powers found themselves in the paradoxical position of possessing the deadliest weapons presently known

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[8]Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy: 1945-1960 (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962), pp. 106-107.

3. The breakdown of diplomacy can be traced to the period of 1932-1936. The newly created one two super-powers individuality; Russia's prime motivations for seeking a new form of relationship stemming from practical politics of Khrushchev, as well as Russian nationalism; the United States unilateral pursuit of strategic imposition and the confirmed pursuit of quasi-isolationist policies. At this point it be said that it seems ironic that the United States ignored the principle of self-determination in Asia and Africa, where it might have enjoyed an element of success, and promoted it behind the iron curtain where it had virtually no chance of success. But too often, Americans have behaved as if communism were the most potent ideological force of the century. In any event, the rise of nationalism and socio-cultural movements that commenced in the post-war years ushered in the so-called "cold war". The United States became a party effectively to conflict in the 1932-1936 period characterized by deterioration of the overall conduct and began effectively to manifest itself in the 1932-1936 period of isolationist policies. The United States became a force for the unified nations, and it ushered out unilateralism in the wake of power centred within the confines of the communication. This only illustrates the extent to which

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[illegible] Van Nostrand, 1960), pp. 105-107.

"Korean economy," The New Yorkers, 1932-1950

to man, and yet being no longer capable of completely dominating the affairs of the world. The destruction of their bipolar concept was sealed. The new environment of international relations had arrived.

Until then, a country could achieve its desires by means of military force if diplomacy had failed. But the advances in science and technology as well as the advent of "third force" politics has altered this situation. It is doubtful if victory could be won in nuclear war. National suicide appears much more likely. And yet we must still examine international relations in the light of force and strategy. Neither human nature nor the basic nation-state system have changed appreciably since the days of Clausewitz. Conventional conflict is not only likely, but highly probable. The fact that nuclear weapons developed at a moment when two states were overwhelmingly more powerful than others only tended to reduce the nation-state system to a precarious "balance of terror" and potential destruction. "It is one of the mockeries of the modern age that peace itself seems to rest upon the mutual fear inspired by the magnitude of nuclear destructiveness."[9]

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[9]David S. McLellan et al., The Theory and Practice of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 141.

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CHAPTER IV

FORCE AND THE NEW ENVIRONMENT

A review of the step-by-step development of this study should serve to clarify the purpose and contribution of this particular segment. An important assumption has been made, and hopefully proven in the foregoing chapter, that the dynamics of international relations in operation at the present time is different in comparison to those that developed in the early years following World War II. Prior to the initiation of these new factors, the dominating trait in the consideration of national security was the reliance upon nuclear strategics as an answer to the distinct possibility of nuclear war. Military force was primarily designed to fulfill a vital need within this nuclear setting, and strategic planning was conducted in relation to the adopted forces. But nuclear war is questionable within the present international environment. What effect, if any, does this have on the utility of force and strategy?

This chapter will take up the first half of this question. Development will consist of another brief look at force and the likelihood of all-out war, the relativity of force, the features of military power in the 1960's, and a quick investigation of America's traditional interpretation of power.

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This chapter will take up the third half of this question. Development will consist of another brief look at force and the likelihood of all-out war, the relativity of force, the features of military power in the 1960's, and a quick investigation of America's traditional interpretation of power.

Total war is unique in its nature. Because of this, the standard relationship between war and territorial power and sovereignty has been drastically altered. The new relationship enables belligerents to by-pass the traditional concepts of national defense. The "old days," or the pre-nuclear days, were a period of international stratification. There were categories of great powers, near-great powers, lesser powers, and a whole assemblage of weaker governments. Each government knew its place and the place of others. The accepted symbols of division included military force. But the advent of atomic and hydrogen weapons has produced an impasse among the powers possessing these weapons. Their nuclear tools are still awe inspiring and sources of continual fascination, but they do not have the day-to-day practicality of the spear, cross-bow, or automatic rifle. The weaker nations, inflamed by the ideology of anti-colonialism and no longer willing to accept their positions in the international pecking order, have taken advantage of the stalemate. Their voice can be heard, and more often than not, they have an attentive audience. It would lead one to believe that perhaps traditional military force has become irrelevant in modern international society. In what way?

The destructiveness of modern weapons has deprived victory in total war of its traditional meaning. Although

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military victory in war is certainly an important pre-condition, it should not necessarily be the only objective. Another vital goal should be the construction of conditions more congenial than those in existence prior to the war. It is doubtful whether victory in a nuclear blizzard of bombs and missiles could provide for a new and better world order. There is evidence that the super-powers realize this by their increased devotion to the alternatives of nuclear war: competitive co-existence and limited or localized wars. Many even believe that because of the unpalatability of nuclear "hangover," the consideration of all-out war has become irrelevant along with military force. Their reasoning grants that a certain chronic tension exists in the world environment where one power seeks to upset the status quo and another is equally determined to prevent this from happening. They pin their hopes, however, on the belief that the ruinous results of overt conflict is so obvious to the parties concerned that nuclear war will be avoided at all possible cost. The emerging nations must surely realize this strange modality; so not only is mankind perhaps faced with the demise of general war, but perhaps it is also witnessing a magnified re-enactment of the collapse of the "feudal system."[1]

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[1]Opinion expressed by Dr. Charles Lerche, delivered

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It would be unfortunate if unbridled optimism were injected into the assumption that "if total war has become irrelevant it has therefore become impossible." This conclusion would make the dangerous supposition that men always behave rationally and that pathological behavior patterns will never again occur in the conduct of international relations. Aside from this unlikelihood, there are several other solid reasons for the valid presumption that total war and the use of nuclear military force is possible. In the first place, one side or the other may miscalculate the likely effects of an aggressive action. Secondly, a war may break out not because of miscalculation arrived at by deliberation, but simply by accident. Thirdly, one side or the other may achieve a genuine technological breakthrough in weapons, delivery systems, or defensive capabilities. Such possibilities could dramatically shift the precarious strategic balance and make war appear as a rational policy. Fourthly, the spread of nuclear weapon availability could conceivably present an insoluble control problem. And lastly, localized conflicts could expand in area and scope until they embraced the major powers to a degree that would make the use of nuclear weapons an only alternative. There is, unfortunately, no assurance that resort to total war as a

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technique of international politics has forever ended. The relationship between war and sovereignty may have been altered, but man can be counted upon to seek and discover new methods of expressing his will, and for seeking and discovering new techniques for the building of new orders more to his liking. Clausewitz, Schlieffen, Mahan, and even Douglas MacArthur, will still be studied and their strategies and tactics will be used in trying to mold a force applicable to our times. It will be a frustrating and tortuous exercise for those that are still convinced that the rules of old are still valid. What these have failed to understand is that the situation is now different.

During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur, perhaps the last of the military classicists, stated in his testimony before Congress that "the minute you reach the killing stage, politics has failed, and the military takes over."[2] It would appear that he was wrong. He was referring to circumstances that simply do not exist. As it has been said before, military force as a technique of action has undergone a transformation. In another era, the United States would have moved in and overthrown Fidel Castro. She

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would not have been restrained by an over-developed sense of virtue in the non-utilization of adequate military power at the Bay of Pigs. But political restraints imposed limitations. In all gradations of combat, force has become and will continue to be subjected to more political restraints. There is a fundamental reason for this. In the new environment, war is no longer defined by capabilities. "Restraint is essential and a selection of means must be made. This is a political decision which is properly the responsibility of the political leaders—not the generals."[3] Samuel Huntington has argued that military officers should approach policy issues concerning the proper constitution of force from a purely professional military viewpoint. This has not always been true in the past; it is not always true now, although the professional military officer of today has a much broader grasp of the political issues involved in world affairs. In any event, "military policy is always the product of politics. Good military policy is only the product of brave choice and ingenious compromise by experienced personnel."[4] This is especially true in 1964.

The basis of this change in the nature of force lies

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[3]Carl H. Amme, "The Changing Nature of Power," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, March, 1963, p. 28.

[4]Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. xii.

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within the character of the new international system. It is not the case of a simple shift of power within a traditional if not sacred system. The salient characteristic of the new system is no longer the confrontation of two dominant world powers. It is the enormous increase in the number of participants and the surprising amount of political power that they wield. Force based on sheer nuclear power, therefore, has assumed questionable relevance. Though military force is perhaps the most fundamental element in a nation's overall strength, it is certainly not the only element, nor is it the most effective in the day-to-day execution of foreign policy. The adhesive that holds the Western alliance system together against the so-called "Communist bloc" is not necessarily the overwhelming military force of the United States, but rather the belief in a common threat, geographical proximity, ideological affinity, and a sense of common purpose.[5]

There are limits to the usefulness of military force. It cannot always be used to compel other nations to accept American aid; it cannot always be used to coerce other nations to accept American positions; it cannot always be used to prevent wide-spread acceptance of Communist ideology. In

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other words, force is not always relevant to certain kinds of foreign policy situations. Recalling the early definition of force as the power to protect national interests, then it is obvious that the attempted utilization of force may, in fact, result in lessened rather than in increased protection of national interests through loss of prestige and failure to comprehend the proper application of other forms of persuasion. Although force may not always be relevant, it is always relative.

Force is relative with respect to time. This fact is highlighted by the distinction between "potential force" and "force-in-being." The great power of the United States is reflected as much if not more in its potential than in its physical presence.[6] Force is also relative to the problem toward which it is directed. Force must always be considered part of a larger national capability to achieve certain objectives. America's capability to defend her shores is quite different from dealing with Communist influence in Africa, raising living standards in Iran, or settling Greco-Turkish disputes. Success in foreign affairs certainly relies upon the skill with which force is applied; but

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perhaps more importantly, success in foreign affairs requires skill in recognizing varied problems and applying the proper type of force to that problem.

Force is relative in at least two additional aspects. One is the relativity of the force with regard to various nations. The ability of the United States to affect the course of international relations requires value judgments concerning comparative capabilities. This is the heart of nuclear stalemate. At one point in history, this country was not required to consider seriously the comparative power of others; it possessed a nuclear monopoly. But the steady accretion in Russian nuclear and missile technology has brought the importance of relative capabilities into sharp focus. Although more difficult to measure, non-military force is equally important. What is the relative capability of the United States and India to persuade Asian masses to pursue a given policy? How much relative force does the United States possess in attempting to gain acceptance of its policy positions within NATO? In international politics there is force and counterforce; American push and Russian or Chinese pull. In order to estimate the effectiveness of a nation's force, it is necessary to identify all the factors in a given international situation.

Lastly, force is relative to the country by which it is applied. As Cecil Crabb has said:

> Merely possessing power, along with even greater potential power, is no guarantee that a nation will exert strong influence in world affairs. Totalitarian regimes are often free to use all the powers at their command for diplomatic ends. Democratic nations, however, usually limit, sometimes severely, the ends for which certain kinds of power may be utilized.[7]

This analysis could be altered to include "totalitarian regimes" as well as democratic nations in the limitations placed upon power in seeking diplomatic ends. This is certainly the case in the new environment. The politically usable forms of force have been altered. Force is still effective; only its make-up has changed. If the nature of force no longer permits its use as an effective means of achieving national objectives, then the form of force must be outmoded. The United States would do well to continue relying upon a nuclear strategy to deter a nuclear war, but it should not delude itself into believing that this type of strategy would be successful in actually fighting a war.[8] The changing nature of force is only being gradually understood and accepted. Both the United States and Russia maintain that peace is the state objective of each country and stress the deterrent role of their military forces. But this still leaves each side frustrated in efforts to find politically usable forms of power to restrain or alter the will of the other.

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[1]Rosenau, Foc. Etc. [2]Kaufmann, Op. Cit. p. 10.

In attempting to answer the question of what comes first, force or strategy, one is faced with an impossible task. They obviously cannot be distinctly separated. The problem, therefore, of attempting to set forth the proper role of force within the oft-mentioned new environment is equally difficult without the aid of certain strategic guideposts. The whole picture will be hopefully completed in Chapter V; however, certain characteristics of the "new force" can be presented. These features constitute what is believed to be the nature of military force in the mid-1960's.

One extremely important point must be reiterated. Military force is a political tool. It is something that is used to retain or achieve national objectives as determined by national interests. Military force as an isolated entity is meaningless. It must have purpose and that purpose should rightfully be distillated from the politics of national interest. Military doctrine and political doctrine, therefore, are intrinsically intertwined. What, then, are the considerations of force with regard to this fact?

First, while in certain cases war has become less useful as an instrument of policy, it cannot be disregarded. Even total war--completely outmoded as a means to achieve or retain political goals--remains a "possibility." The chances of miscalculation or irrationality have been

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mentioned previously. General war forces must, therefore, be maintained in a constant state of readiness. Security is not the gift of nature, or a God-given right, or even a starting point in policy formulation. It has become the product of effort--the end result of policy. It has become the dominant goal of foreign policy, with foreign policy itself often defined as a branch of national security policy.[9] The environment in which this policy is born cannot be overlooked; and although that environment may be one of nuclear stalemate, it is still nuclear. Security is not absolute. It is a value judgment and each sovereignty must determine the measures and means for safeguarding its survival.[10] This will, and should, include nuclear weapons.

Force should also have conventional characteristics. This would allow additional flexibility in diplomacy and would enable the possessor to negotiate confidently for the control of nuclear arms. However, balance of force is essential. Conventional forces should not be considered a substitute for a nuclear war capability but as a complement to it. Against an opponent equipped with nuclear weapons, it would be suicidal to rely entirely or preponderantly upon conventional force. Potential aggressors must understand

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[9]Huntington, op. cit., p. 426.

[10]Ibid.

conventional force. Potential aggressors must understand it would be suicidal to rely entirely or preponderantly upon superiority for a nuclear war capability but as a complement to it. Against an opponent equipped with nuclear weapons, control of nuclear arms. However, balance of force is essential. Conventional forces should not be considered a substitute for a nuclear war capability but as a complement to it. Against an opponent equipped with nuclear weapons, it would be suicidal to rely entirely or preponderantly upon conventional force. Potential aggressors must understand

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[9] Hoffmann, _op. cit._, p. 152.

that the United States is in a position to match any increment of force, nuclear or conventional with that which he might possess or be inclined to utilize. This would reduce the incentive to engage in some form of aggression and provides the best opportunity for limiting or eliminating hostilities.

In addition, as certain forms of force become even more irrelevant as techniques for action in the achievement of political objectives, governmental leaders will have to recognize fully and accept the role of military power in the field of insurgency and counter-insurgency. This requires the closest possible coordination between political, economic and psychological efforts. To interpret "unconventional warfare" only in military terms invites miserable and costly failure. Once again, clear-cut military victory in the classical sense is virtually impossible in such cases. It is not a case of pursuing a "no win" policy; it is a case of accepting the realities of a <u>different environment</u>. A desirable political and psychological setting must be established as part of the campaign and in light of existing geographic and economic conditions. It is generally accepted that we are past the point where men live in caves and throw rocks at their enemies. The nuclear age requires a modicum of sophistication.

Fourthly, the changing nature of force will continue

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

to result in more and more detailed political control over the utilization of that force. A long-standing tradition in the United States has been the unshakable belief in a clear-cut dichotomy between war and peace. A sign of maturity is the slow dissolvement of this shibboleth. Policy-makers, and to a lesser extent the general public, are realizing that the devastating power of our military force requires more selection and control over its use. The current nature of international relations will require continued collaboration between military and civilian officials.

Lastly, the nature of force should be such that it promotes confidence within the general public and serves to bind the support of the public to the decisions of the policy-making elites. This requires acceptance of the new environment by the general public. This, in turn, requires an examination of basic attitudes by the American people. This examination should consist of an inward look at the possibilities of peace, attitudes toward Russia, and attitudes toward the cold war. Peace need not be impractical and war need not be inevitable. Americans should not be blind to differences that exist between the United States and Russia, but we should not be blind to common interests and the means by which differences can be resolved. And Americans should remember that we must deal with the world as it is today, and not as it might have been had the history

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of the last twenty years been different. The cold war has changed in its nature. Force must be non-provocative, carefully controlled, designed to deter, and capable of selective use.[11]

It seems appropriate, while discussing the American public, to discuss briefly another aspect of force, which is indirectly associated with military force in the prevailing international situation. However, it is related rather closely with the topic of the preceding paragraph; that is, the acceptance by the American public of the realities of world politics and the use of force in the 1960's. The major problem that most Americans seem unable to solve involves the means of meeting their ends--as opposed to the ends themselves. Not only do Americans lose their sense of balance between ends and means, but there is a tendency to disregard the true nature and limitations of force, particularly with relation to matters beyond the immediate control of the national government. There are three basic reasons for this tendency: (1) an extraordinarily successful history; (2) unbounded faith in law and legislation; and (3) equal faith in technique and material factors. The result has been a failure to recognize the vicissitudes of power and the cincture that this places around the organs of foreign policy planning and execution.

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[11]John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address, The American University, Washington, D. C., June 10, 1963.

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An expansion of these three basic reasons would include the favorable geographic circumstances of the United States which, in turn, includes its natural resources and climatic conditions. Being so richly endowed, the United States has not been forced to rely very heavily upon the compromise of interests and its ramifications of foreign policy. Also, a certain "old world-new world" dichotomy has left the citizens of the United States with an ingrained suspicion of traditional diplomacy. A manifestation of this fear was detectable in Woodrow Wilson's desire for "open diplomacy" following World War I. But perhaps the most significant explanation--which appears to be a composite of all--is a historical wish for perfection. Foreign policy and, consequently, national security policy, conceived in terms of principles and based on faith was believed to be the only method of overcoming the evils of power politics. Foreign policy so designed was guaranteed to capture the appeal of public opinion; foreign policy designed to express a compromise of interests was guaranteed to result in suspicion. The typical American approach to foreign relations has thus been littered with stereotyped prejudices, sacred cows, wishful conceptions, and fixed emotionalism. The fundamental weakness is a failure to recognize and admit that rivalry and strife among states, communities, and factions are the normal condition of mankind.

An expansion of these three basic reasons would include the favorable geographic circumstances of the United States which, in turn, includes its natural resources and climatic conditions. Being so richly endowed, the United States has not been forced to rely very heavily upon the complexities of interests and its ramifications of foreign policy. Also, a certain "old world-new world" dichotomy has left the citizens of the United States with an ingrained suspicion of traditional diplomacy. A manifestation of this fear was detectable in Woodrow Wilson's desire for "open diplomacy" following World War I. But perhaps the most significant explanation--which appears to be a composite of all--is a historical wish for perfection. Foreign policy and, consequently, national security policy, conceived in terms of principles and based on faith was believed to be the only method of overcoming the evils of power politics. Foreign policy so designed was structured to capture the appeal of public opinion; foreign policy designed to express a compromise of interests was structured to result in subjection. The typical American approach to foreign relations has thus been lighted with exaggerated simplicity, excess zeal, wishful conceptions, and fixed convictions. Its uncompromising weakness is a failure to recognize the subtle complexities of international politics, and

The point in mentioning this opinion is to illustrate the difficulty that accompanies a basic shift in America's international behavior. There is still a belief that the United States can influence all events in world politics; there is the persistent belief that if just enough patience, or just enough money, or if just enough force is applied, or if we just talk long enough and loud enough, then Democracy and the United States of American will triumph. It is not at all surprising that large segments of American public opinion consider elements of the new environment, with regard to accommodation with Russia, as "appeasement." No nation in history has placed so much emphasis upon "principle" in dealing with other countries as the United States. "No compromise with principle" is a perennial cry. During the 1950's for example, a major obstacle to high-level diplomatic conferences among the great powers was widespread belief within the American population that such conferences inherently favored the "enemy." A form of undeviating opposition arose to any form of conduct at these conferences that did not adhere to a preconceived idea of what the all-American position should be. Certain groups within American society have come dangerously close to equating the very process of diplomacy itself with "appeasement" and "abandonment of principle." These highly-vocal groups have placed many barriers in the path of a flexible and imaginative

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diplomacy.[12] Such extremist views, views which consider moderation no virtue, can easily smash the delicate strategic balance that exists and remove all doubt concerning the inevitability of nuclear war.

How effective or worthwhile was this engagement of "force utility" as a dynamic of current international relations? As suggested, perhaps the whole fabric will appear after "strategic utility" has been discussed; for it is through strategy that the elements of force are reflected in form of policy or posture. Nevertheless, force was investigated, and the effort was directed at the following points:

1. The relationship between war and force has been one of the time-honored sacraments that have been altered by the new situational factors of world politics. The practicality of nuclear weapons was questioned as tools of effective foreign policy, particularly with relation to the problems presented by the proliferation of new political entities.

2. It was reiterated that, despite the degree of improbability involved, nuclear war can still occur through miscalculation or irrational policy selections by

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[12] Synonyms for appeasement listed by Webster - to pacify, quiet, calm, sooth, allay - suggest that the idea i basic to human relationships and that there is nothing intrinsically immoral about the concept. Unfortunately, the term is invariably equated with the kind of sell-out epitomized at Munich in 1938.

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governmental leaders. However, the classic meaning of victory in war appears to have been a casualty of the nuclear age.

3. Another by-product of this evolution in international relations has been the changed nature of force itself. Now, as never before, political restraints are part and parcel of the force structure.

4. Although military force may no longer be relevant to all situations that arise in the conduct of foreign affairs, it is now constantly relative. This relativeness is manifested in four ways:

a. It is relative with regard to time; i.e., potential force in relation to "force-in-being."

b. It is relative to the problem to which it is directed.

c. It is relative also to comparative capabilities of various nations.

d. Lastly, it is relative to the nation wishing to apply its force. This firmly illustrates the limitations that are placed upon the utilization of <u>all</u> kinds of force.

5. The five most obvious features of force in the 1960's were then presented and discussed. These consisted of:

a. The continued necessity of nuclear weapons.

b. The requirement of conventional force.

b. The replacement of conventional force.

c. The combined uncertainty of nuclear weapons.

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c. The budding need for insurgency and counter-insurgency force.

d. The absolute requirement for continued political restraint in the utilization of military force.

e. The need for support and understanding by the general public.

6. The last topic for investigation, or better yet, expression of opinion, concerned the traditional American misunderstanding of power and its proper uses in international relations. The purpose was to demonstrate the difficulty, but necessity, for "re-educating" the American public to the terms and conditions of the new environment. This environment marks the "renaissance of diplomacy," and yet the American people are still stumbling around in the diplomatic "Middle Ages," attempting to understand and truly appreciate the standard role that diplomacy plays in the conduct of world affairs.

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CHAPTER V

STRATEGY IN THE NEW ENVIRONMENT

Early in the study, a specialized definition was given of strategy where it was said that strategy, both an art and a science, has become a method of selecting the military weapons and forces necessary to secure or retain the objectives of the state, with objectives themselves determining or influencing the choice. This may be expressed by equating military systems with military force; strategy then becomes the policy position that determines how the force will be utilized. This is a classical relationship that has endured throughout history. The question is now raised regarding the implications of this relationship in the age of thermonuclear weapons and hopeful accommodation. The primary purpose of this chapter is to investigate this problem; secondarily, it should provide a more defined picture of the "force-strategy dynamic."

The analysis will consist of a discussion on national and military objectives with a re-emphasis of the proper role of military force in the determination of national political goals. In addition, uncertainties that plague strategy selection will be mentioned; the capabilities and limitations that influence, or should influence, strategy planning will receive attention; and finally, strategic

CHAPTER A

STRATEGY IN THE NEW ENVIRONMENT

needs of the United States will be suggested and a specific need for national purpose will be stressed.

It is necessary to keep clear the distinction between political and military objectives. Although they are not separate, they are definitely different. Sovereignties do not wage war for war's sake, but rather in the pursuit of a political policy. The military objectives established within various theaters of operations, or on specific battlefields, are merely means to a political end. Therefore, the military objective should be governed by the political objective and subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily impossible. This is uniquely important in the nuclear age. Adaptations must be made in national objectives to include consideration of the practical limitations that are placed upon strength, capabilities, and political situations. It is within the context of these various situational factors that the objectives of the nation must be determined. If national security is considered one of the most important objectives of the state then it is a simple exercise in deduction to realize that the utilization of force (i.e., strategy) must be conducted with keen appreciation for the political limitations involved. The mere possession of force does not guarantee its successful use in world politics. The United States and Russia both have harnessed tremendous sources of power, but neither

need of the United States will be suggested and a specific need for national purpose will be stressed.

It is necessary to keep clear the distinction between political and military objectives. Although they are not separate, they are decidedly different. Investigations do not mean war for war's sake, but rather in the pursuit of a political policy. The military objectives established within various theaters of operations, or on specific battlefields, are merely means to a political end. Therefore, the military objective should be governed by the political objective and subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily impossible. This is evidently important in the nuclear age. Adaptations must be made to national objectives to include consideration of the practical limitations that are placed upon strategy, capabilities, and political attitudes. It is within the context of these various situations or factors that the objectives of the nation must be determined. A national security is considered but one of the most important objectives of the active Air Force. It is a simple exercise in deduction to realize that the attainment of such "ends," ultimately must be measured with respect to the political framework within which they are to be achieved.

can be assured that the other or a third party will be duly influenced in its international behavior so as to insure the protection of basic interests of either of the great powers. As was mentioned previously, force is a relative factor. This applies to its nature as well as its use.

Assuming that national security is the foremost goal of American foreign policy, then it must be realized that the strategics of national security must have foundations that are embedded in realistic politics. This truth prevails in the new environment just as it has for generations past. American national interests have been endangered before—long before Communism arose as a powerful world force. It seems ironic that the reaction should be so uncertain and emotional. Although Americans are uncomfortable discussing international relations in the language of "power politics," they are very accustomed to discussing the "reality" of power in their daily lives. They devote considerable time and effort in "winning friends and influencing people," trying to obtain promotions, trying to pass or defeat various pieces of legislation. These are all efforts to exercise power. Yet, there is the nagging belief that power in foreign affairs can be eliminated or should be eliminated. It is generally believed that if the United States possesses the largest and most impressive military force in the world, then everyone will concede to American

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It should be obvious, therefore, that the initial requirements for analyzing strategy in the new environment is acceptance of the premise that force is a tool of politics; and that the method in which this force is utilized constitutes strategy; and the selection of a strategy must consider the situational factors that are at work within the political structure of international relations. It must be realized that a concept for international relations should not be limited to negative goals, wishful thinking, or defensive reactions. International relations, and strategy selection, is analogous to international politics and should be approached with a positive understanding of power relationships; power with purpose. The objectives of a nation should be a workable and tolerable balance of those relationships.

Within this intellectual structure of international politics and national objectives, the process of strategic planning should give recognition to the inevitable presence of variables, uncertainties, national capabilities, and overall limitations. As this country comes to grips with the new environment, it is faced with a complex and difficult problem: it must evolve long-range plans for greater strategic flexibility in the face of these numerous

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uncertainties and capabilities. These problems must be identified and placed in perspective before a reasonably successful solution can be derived. Only by taking a long-term view of both American national values and purposes can the first step be taken. First, the uncertainties:

1. Technological change. The lead time required to recognize applications of new technologies and then to incorporate them into an operational weapon is very lengthy, perhaps five to ten years at least. Future technologies will surely render some new weapons now in development obsolescent before they become fully deployable.

2. Intelligence. Much of strategic planning is based on estimates of enemy capabilities--present and future. This is an extremely hazardous operation, particularly when one considers that current estimates are, at best, derived with the help of something less than a perfect science; and it is only possible to project into the future from an estimate of the present.

3. General planning problems. This is a broad category that includes all of the accepted difficulties that arise within a democratic society that is heavily bound by bureaucratic lines of authority and communication. The problems of general planning also include an elusive "x" factor. Once a weapons system is selected in support of a specific element of strategy, will it meet predicted schedules and performance goals?

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4. Political stability. The United States may seek stabilization to general war through a mutual deterrent, but it is very hard to stabilize the politics of a fermenting world—as in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.

5. The strategic balance-of-terror. This delicate balance may shift at anytime. If one side or the other exploits new advances in defense technology, the other side's ballistic-missile force may become obsolete. This change in balance could certainly influence strategic thinking. In addition, the balance could easily be affected by the political stability of the remainder of the world, or by drastic shifts within the internal political structures of either the United States or Russia. The careful prevention of any pressures that might possibly tip the balance is closely associated with the values and objectives of the giants seated on this deadly seesaw.

6. Values. This "uncertainty" requires careful expansion. Both the United States and Russia are faced with the old moral problem concerning the relationship between power and values. Each side must seek and discover fresh answers to this relationship in light of their almost unlimited acquisition of sheer power. The thermonuclear weapon is not just another explosive. Missiles are not just "different" weapons. Together they represent a quantum jump

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5. Timing. This uncertainty requires careful weighing of the moral problem concerning the relationship between time and values. Can the United States and Russia be left with the old moral problem concerning the relationship between power and values. Can this ever be? Did Niebuhr leave anyone in this country with a right or that right under the existing and accepted definition of Super Power. The Christian-ethic must confront the political realities. Niebuhr can not just

in the power to destroy the most basic values known to mankind--people, wealth, culture, and history itself. The danger of unilateral annihilation is real; the danger of mutual annihilation is equally real. Each side has a responsibility of attempting to prevent this tragedy that could occur either by accident or by some crazed nihilist who rejects all values.[1] Another point should be mentioned as well: can anyone predict with certainty the level of damage that Russians are willing to sustain under all possible future political conditions? We might assume that a high-tension international situation could cause Russian leaders to estimate that all-out thermonuclear war is the least undesirable option available to them.

Although long-term planning can be hampered by uncertain variables, there are a few tangible "constants" that should be considered. It may be said that these represent American capabilities.[2] Before briefly examining these, however, three important points should be mentioned with regard to general capability. These were touched upon earlier in a different context, but their relevancy appears

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[1]Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff (eds.), American Strategy for the Nuclear Age (New York: Doubleday, 1960), p. 174.

[2]An excellent analysis of American capabilities appears in Chapter 9 of Dr. Charles Lerche's Foreign Policy of the American People (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

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American capabilities would include favorable geographic conditions with due regard to such items as physical location, internal waterways and other modes of transportation, and climatological conditions. Also included among these capabilities would be the favorable demographic pattern within American society; that is, population density, median age, manpower pool, general population trends, and the political, economic, and social structure of the United States. Consideration would have to be given additionally to natural resources, industrial and agricultural production, military power and potential, the educational and technical level of competence within our society, and national morale. Dr. Charles Lerche considers national morale to be the capacity of a nation to perform efficiently under prolonged

especially applicable at this juncture. First, a nation's capability is highly relative to other nations and to their objectives. No nation is "capable" in a vacuum or without purpose. Secondly, capability, like its corollary of national security, is a dynamic phenomenon whose elements are constantly in a state of flux. Thirdly, time has a major impact upon capability. Capabilities must not only be predicated upon current military and political situations, but must also be formulated in regard to trends and future possibilities. Keeping these three criteria in mind, the following may be stated:

American capabilities would include favorable geographic conditions with due regard to such items as physical location, natural waterways and other modes of transportation, and climatological conditions. Also included among these capabilities would be the favorable demographic pattern within American society; that is, population density, median age, manpower pool, general population trends, and the political, economic, and social structure of the United States. Consideration would have to be given additionally to natural resources, industrial and agricultural production, military power and potential, the educational and technical level of competence within our society, and national morale. Or, there is much considered national morale to be the

stress, thereby serving as an index of the degree to which people follow their leaders through the labyrinth of foreign policy.[3]

In the final analysis, review of capabilities, limitations, and uncertainties, as well as that of the nature of nuclear war itself, reveals two specific items to bear in mind in strategy development. First, military force is a means of obtaining national objectives. There would appear to be nothing inherently good in military force or in military operations, and their functional purpose is measurable only to the extent that they contribute to the objectives of the state. These, in turn, must be determined by the exigencies of the international political and military environment and the relevancy or applicability of various forms of force--be they political or military. Second, like other tools and techniques, military force covers a wide spectrum of possible uses. The organization, training, research, personnel policies, and weapons systems must envisage the various types of missions which are likely to develop. Looking ridiculous would be the least of our worries if we based our military plans and strategy on the assumption of a nuclear war, only to encounter major threats of a different nature.

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[3] Ibid., pp. 250-251.

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[3] Ibid., p. 109-11.

Decisions made on the basis of all the various factors mentioned are not simple to make, but their difficulty is no excuse for avoiding judgments or postponing choices. The alternatives have to be realized in light of political and technological realities and based as closely as possible upon a valid interpretation of national values and objectives. This may appear truistic, but as Bernard Brodie is careful to point out, strategic planning can result in errors between the acceptance of an idea in principle and the implementation of it through appropriately selected plans and actions.[4] A problem of the United States is that in thinking about war and peace it does so within an intellectual and emotional framework largely molded in the musty past. Images, slogans, ideas, and attitudes relating to the subject of war are filtered through a historical experience of war back when it was a limited-liability operation. Errors in value judgments can easily be made under such circumstances. In any event, the people of this country have made a remarkably unanimous and largely covert decision against preventive war. This is without doubt a valid decision that meets with no serious objection, but the conditions of the nuclear age have made this decision, be it an error

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[4]Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 391.

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or not, extremely important. It is one of the facts of life that is absolutely basic to strategic planning; for in giving up the "solution" of preventive war, the American people have accepted a situation that binds them to a strategy of deterrence. Three vital strategic considerations must be made as a result of this situation. First of all, we must strive to maintain the current balance between Russian and American nuclear forces and, if possible, extend the American position out of the backwater of parity and into a position of undisputed superiority. Secondly, the United States has to maintain a real and substantial capability for coping with limited and local aggression. This is to avoid finding ourselves in the frustrating position of being unable to stem such aggression without resort to the kind of force which may be totally inappropriate and which may critically increase the risk of nuclear war. The third strategic principle to consider is that the danger of total war, although improbable, is nevertheless within the realm of possibility. Military postures and diplomatic negotiations must be maintained and conducted with this unnerving fact in mind.

Preventive war, Massive Retaliation, and even the Counterforce concept enunciated as recently as 1962-1963, by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, are hopefully semantic milestones along the road to a U.S. strategy that provides

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It is felt that the mention of an additional factor in the strategic fabric is imperative. It is surely the most decisive limitation in American strategy formulation. Force and strategy are virtually meaningless unless focused by national purpose and a sense of direction. Equally important to the clarification of national purpose, and actually a part of the whole, is the absolute necessity for abandoning a set of empty abstractions that have served as poor substitutes for real purpose. Charles Lerche presents this plea incisively in his book Foreign Policy of the American People:

> (The terms) security, peace, good faith, trust, and all their countless elaborations have--despite their intrinsic desirability--in fact been used as pretexts

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> for a refusal to come to grips with real problems in concrete contexts. Considering the nature of the cold war and the insolubility of the problems it spawned, the formulation of American objectives in abstract terms usually did little harm and occasionally considerable good. But the issues of the future will not respond to either temporizing or evasion; if the United States is not to be left hopelessly behind events, Americans must develop notions of purpose that are adequate to the concrete conditions.[5]

It has been said that strategy development must be conducted utilizing the guidelines of political reality, flexible response, and meaningful national purpose. To aid in providing a more complete picture, something should be said with regard to a chosen strategy's contribution to the necessity for stability in international relations. This is based upon the important assumption that stability in the world environment is in the best interests of the United States. In essence, the selection of a particular strategy or amalgamation of different strategies, depends on a subjective feeling which a nation tries to create in an opponent's mind. This feeling should be compounded of respect and fear, but should not be such that it transmits evidence of aggressive intent. The effective operation of a strategy over the long term requires that the opponent be willing to live with his enemy's possession of the capability upon which the strategy rests. Another of the

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military classicists, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, observed that "force is never more operative than when it is known to exist but is not brandished." This would appear to be a critical ingredient of the new environment. The function of force shaped into strategy is the credibility of that force, and the feasibility of utilization in the event that the delicate environmental balance is destroyed. The feasibility of that force can only be created on the basis of "usable" power and a practical appreciation of the political restraints at work within the environment. Historic principles of power in politics hold unchanged even though completely new strategies may be devised. Power and strategy must serve a political goal; military action must be subordinate to political aims. Strategy must not be solely dictated by technology; strategy in the new environment should not be developed by extending the strategies of the past.

In conclusion, our weapons, strategy, and even tactics, must be considered and adopted without the trial of war—despite the blessings of technology. We must choose and then accept the risks. We have to be prepared at any moment to go with what we have on the shelf. Thus, in a world susceptible to military and political unstability, strategic plans must be under constant review. This must be tempered by such factors as national policy, enemy capabilities and intentions, our own capabilities, technological

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In conclusion, our weapons, strategy, and even tactics, must be considered and adopted without the trial of war--despite the pleasance of technology. We must choose and then accept the risks. We have to be prepared at any moment to do with what we have at the start. Then, in a world unacceptable to military and political mentality, strategic plans may be more consistent options. This must be compared by such factors as material policy, enemy capabilities and intentions, our own capabilities, tactics, logical

developments, and economic allocations. We must, consequently, rely upon guidelines rather than dogmas, and the overall posture must be both credible and feasible. It is obvious that the United States requires strategic delivery forces that are able to absorb a surprise attack if it should come and still deal a crushing return blow. In addition, we require both active and passive defensive measures. We can assume that potential aggressors are rational, but we should plan on irrationality and/or miscalculation. We also have to be prepared to meet limited aggression. The forces to accomplish this should be predicated upon consideration of the probable extent and nature of limited war. Our interest should not only be the avoidance of nuclear war, but the localization or deterrence of these lesser conflicts. In connection with this, the forces of the United States should be designed and trained to cope with the insidious nature of non-conventional warfare. This type of conflict is the perfect manifestation of the political and psychological potentialities of modern warfare.

In less complicated days, even as recently as fifteen years ago, the strategy of deterrence was fairly simple and involved little more than Teddy Roosevelt's dictum of "walk softly and carry a big stick." Those days are irretrievably gone. The big stick has grown monsterously large, and yet it must be handled with the finesse of a scalpel. Strategy

it must be cradled with the fineese of a sculptor. Strategy done. The big stick was drawn monstrously large, and yet softly and carry a big stick." These days are increasingly involved little more than Teddy Roosevelt's dictum of "walk years ago, the strategy of deterrence was fairly simple and

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and deterrence have become a matter of reciprocity, and the premium is now on diversification and diplomacy. It is not realistic to think that real or imagined enemies will obediently roll over and play dead because of a bombastic threat or loud proclamations of righteousness. The military force involved must be able to survive and penetrate. The force--in whatever form it takes--must be able to leave here and get there. It must be flexible enough to meet all possible contingencies. Before any of this can be done with anything approaching guaranteed success, there must be at least two fundamental adjustments made in the basic philosophy of the United States. First, foreign policy--as well as national security policy--should be made to serve a national purpose; this purpose, or national interest, must be clearly understood within the framework of realistic world politics. Second, there must be an understanding that power is a valuable tool with the capacity to achieve intended results by affecting the actions of others, provided it is utilized with practicality, realism, and purpose. Neither of these adjustments will provide black and white answers to all situations, nor will they provide the United States with a magic formula. Such required re-evaluation will surely be accompanied by a degree of pain and discomfort, but the task should be undertaken. Perhaps a few bloated moral beliefs will have to be punctured and a few sacred cows slaughtered,

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but fresh reassurance and re-defined purpose makes the effort worthwhile. Above all else, there must exist a "will to utilize" force if and when necessary and in a realistic manner. This appears to be our best defense in avoiding international imposition, and even worse, the indescribable carnage of a possible nuclear war.

A broad range of topics has been recognized in this section of the study, and it may initially appear that depth has been sacrificed for scope. It is optimistically believed, however, that closer reading will reveal a deep thrust at two of the key themes of the study: the imperativeness of realistic, political purpose in strategy development, and the attendant subordination of pure military objectives. In general, the unabashed presentation of these beliefs and the remaining discourse on strategy in the new environment may be abridged as follows:

1. Distinction was drawn at the outset between political objectives and military objectives. War is not waged for the enjoyment of battle or to evaluate the effectiveness of weapons; war is fought in the pursuit of political policies. These policies should be derived so that the goals of any required military support are realistic and obtainable. This in no way demeans the possession of a substantial force--quite the contrary. Possession of a credible and feasible military force provides for effectiveness in

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the execution of foreign policy inside the arena of internationalism. The recognition of the applicability of "power politics" must be accomplished. Military force is, therefore, required, but the strategics of realistic politics should determine the manner in which that force is utilized.

2. The variables, or uncertainties, of strategic planning were enumerated and consisted of technological change, intelligence gathering and evaluation, overall planning problems, political stability throughout the world, the finely-drawn strategic balance between the United States and Russia, and the relationship between power and values.

3. In addition, certain constants were mentioned in relation to national capabilities. These were approached from the standpoint of the United States and included geographic factors, demographic considerations, and the economic power and potential of this country.

4. It was suggested that the current posture of the United States has been the result of a denial of preventive war as a "solution"--leaving a firm commitment to the strategy of deterrence. The necessity of this position is quite clear when thought is given to the dangers of the nuclear age. However, nuclear deterrence alone does not provide for adequate response to other forms of conflict; thus, the growth of "flexible response" has occurred as an

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answer to localized and conventional warfare as well as to non-conventional conflict.

5. The theme of "purpose" was reiterated once more. The suggestion was made that regardless of what political policy is adopted or what form military support might take, it is all irrelevant unless directed by national purpose and objective. Abstractions cannot serve as substitutes for goals. The world environment must be recognized for what it is and appropriate objectives formulated. These objectives may have to be limited in order to correspond with situational factors, but each step taken should provide foundation for additional progress.

6. The importance of maintaining the present strategic balance was stressed. This appears most critical. It is necessary to maintain a credible force, but it should not be such that it transmits aggressive intent to our enemies.

7. Finally, two fundamental adjustments in the philosophy of the United States were offered. These included, once again, the truistic requirement that strategy should serve some realistic national purpose. In addition, power was presented as a valuable tool provided it is utilized with practicality and realism.

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CHAPTER VI

OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS

In the beginning, it was stated that the primary considerations of the study would entail investigation of nuclear war's influence on international relations and the roles of force and strategy within the resulting environment. A digest of the major points discussed in the development of this effort should reveal the results of the investigation.

Atomic science has produced weapons of war that extend the dimensions of man's destructive capability beyond comprehension. The result, however, has been paradoxical. As knowledge and skill produced more and deadlier tools of war, and as these devices became operational in the hands of the two post-war powers, the will to utilize this power within the traditional context of military force became flaccid. But the specter of possibility remains, and the rules of possible nuclear warfare have their own macabre and remorseless logic: (1) the first blow in a nuclear war must be the last if classical victory is to be achieved; (2) the aggressor must thus possess an overwhelming superiority of force; (3) this required superiority is virtually unattainable according to current evaluation; (4) retaliation is thereby a distinct threat and there is every reason to believe that it would achieve crippling success. The mutual

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strategy of deterrence has been the inevitable conclusion. Not only is a deterrent capability mandatory in the age of possible nuclear war, but the possession of a credible retaliatory force is a vital ingredient in the maintenance of nuclear stability. Further irony is found in the fact that it is this same stability that has contributed to the new environment.

As suggested, nuclear stalemate is not the only factor in the changed complexion of international relations. Political pressures, and notably the rising influence of neo-nationalism, have influenced foreign affairs and national security. These have had their effect on force. Military victory in a nuclear war is now questionable, and the very nature of force and its applicability in the conduct of relations has been altered. There is still a relationship between force and national aim; force is still required in order to attain objectives, but it is no longer the acquisition and operational efficacy of sheer military might that is of crucial importance. Reliance upon pure military force can now work to the disadvantage of a state in the pursuit of its goals. Military power is still one consideration, but it has lost its relevance in the nuclear age as an effective means of protecting national interests. Military force must be accompanied by a resurgence of understanding with regard to the realities of usable power, which include

strategy of deterrence has been the inevitable conclusion. Not only is a deterrent capability mandatory in the age of possible nuclear war, but the possession of a credible retaliatory force is a vital ingredient in the maintenance of nuclear stability. Further irony is found in the fact that it is this same stability that has contributed to the new environment.

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political, economic, psychological, and diplomatic force: "total force" guided by realistic goals.

In order to form this relationship, there must be clearly-defined national objectives that are reasonable and capable of attainment within the framework of the new environment. Military objectives must become secondary to political objectives. This is not to say that unadulterated military force has become secondary; the proper role of this force must be correctly understood as a valuable and necessary tool--but only in the support of the primary political objectives of the nation-state. This requires a balance of military strength so that it may be called upon to serve a variety of purposes as dictated by the needs and requirements of the government.

The proper approach, therefore, requires nuclear stability, re-defined national purpose, diversification of military force, realization of the proper role and feasible uses of that force, and a refined appreciation for the capabilities and possible achievements of diplomacy. The posture should be diplomatic and motivated by meaningful political goals, supported by a diverse military force, and conducted with an understanding of what can be accomplished within the new environment with usable forms of power.

There is undoubtedly much more that can be said about force, strategy, and their proper relationship to

political, economic, psychological, and diplomatic forces: "total force" guided by realistic goals.

In order to form this relationship, there must be clearly-defined national objectives that are reasonable and capable of attainment within the framework of the new environment. Military objectives must become secondary to political objectives. This is not to say that unadulterated military force has become secondary; the proper role of this force must be correctly understood as a valuable and necessary tool--but only in the support of the primary political objectives of the nation-state. This requires a balance of military strength so that it may be called upon to serve a variety of purposes as dictated by the needs and requirements of the government.

The proper employment, therefore, requires nuclear stability, re-defined national purpose, diversification of military force, restriction of the proper role and feasible uses of that force, and a refined appreciation for the capabilities and possible curtailments of diplomacy. The posture should be diplomatic and motivated by meaningful political goals, supported by a diverse military force, and conducted with an understanding of what can be accomplished within the new environment with usable forms of power.

There is undoubtedly much more that can be said about force, strategy, and their proper relationship to

of American omnipotence. Americans can no longer treat all countries alike—be they enemies they are trying to dissuade or allies they are trying to control. There are adversaries that cannot be swept aside and there are allies that cannot be dictated. Loud talk and wishful thinking no longer will suffice.

What are the roles of force and strategy in the new environment? Force must be existent. Force is existent, but it is imperative that it be flexible, consist of something more than armed might, and be subject to immediate support of a more total effort. Strategy must be formulated in response to realistic purpose and obtainable objectives. The United States must sharpen its understanding of how the spectrum of conflict operates in today's world. The United States must recognize that this spectrum includes the struggle produced by economic, political, and technological progress.** These dynamic forces should be made to work for accomplishment and may be substituted for the more recognizable and orthodox means of warfare. The first task of free government, if it is to survive, is to master this intellectual challenge. The entire pattern of force and its utilization within a strategic framework must be re-evaluated. Infatuation with purely legal distinctions and solutions, the artificial dichotomy between war and peace, and an almost mystical faith in American infallibility must all give way

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to realistic appraisal and comprehension of the whole problem. It is only through such comprehension that America will be able effectively to create strategies and implement force structures that will fulfill the purposes of the country. It is only on such a basis that the United States will be able to achieve maximum advantage from its many resources. Many traditions may have to fall by the wayside, but elements of the traditional American character will continue to serve well: the traits of ingenuity, intelligence, and inspiration. To these we must add patience and flexibility. The time is now.

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international relations. The list of subjects or topics is infinite. Various omissions have been purposely made, and include such fascinating things as Global Strategic Concepts, Economic Potential for War, Psychological Considerations in Total War, the Idea of Mutual Invulnerability, and such specific aspects of strategy as All-Out Counterforce Retaliation and Limited Counter-City Retaliation As A Bargaining Tactic. But the objective has not been to try and say everything about the subject—only something. Touching all aspects would require more knowledge and audaciousness than exhibited here. The expectation is that perhaps some of the more important considerations have been presented. A person's own interests, requirements, and curiosity will have to supply what is missing. To conclude, it is believed that an offering of personal conclusions, based on the reading, research, and contemplation done in preparation of this essay, is expected. They will be compassionately brief.

1. <u>The presence of a new environment is real</u>. Conditions in the world of 1964 are different than they were in 1945. The advances in nuclear technology and their attendant effects upon the nature of nuclear military power have been discussed previously in varying lengths, but the world environment is different in other ways. A revolution has taken place in the former colonial and less-developed areas of Africa and Asia. Many new nations have won their independence;

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include such fascinating things as Global Strategic Concepts,
Economic Potential for War, Psychological Considerations in
Total War, the Idea of Mutual Invulnerability, and such
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research, and contemplation done in preparation of this
essay, is expected. They will be comparatively brief.

a. The Relevance of a New Civilization is Past. Com-
pared to the world of 1964 we differ not so much as they were in
1914. The advances in nuclear technology and their attendant
effects upon the nature of warfare will only serve to have been
dismissed eventually as relatively insignificant, not the world-
changers it is referred to as today. A revolution has taken
place in the Soviet colonial and imperialized areas of

both the number of new nations and the rate in which they have sprung up are vastly different than what was anticipated. Political reaction to these amazing events is suffering from a conceptual lag. These nations have acquired a special importance in world affairs for a number of reasons: strategic location, large and growing populations, resources, and above all, the magnitude of their own problems, to which the rest of the world cannot remain indifferent. This is a political and economic problem--one that cannot readily be influenced by military force. These changes that have occurred in the international order require new techniques in problem-solving. The accelerated pace of change has upset traditions, created new demands, encouraged revolutionary ferment. It affects what nations want and what they can and cannot do. Governments of today must deal with complex situations requiring political and economic finesse. Success will go to those who exhibit knowledge and appreciation for the delicate use of relevant forms of force. Nuclear power is no longer relevant, other than in helping to maintain a strategic balance. Nuclear force within the new environment is only "usable" as a deterrent force--and as Glenn Synder has said--deterrence is the negative application of power. What is thus needed is a means of expressing positive applications of power.

2. <u>The nature of the new environment is political.</u>

both the number of new nations and the rate in which they have sprung up are vastly different than what was anticipated. Political reaction to these amazing events is suffering from a conceptual lag. These nations have acquired a special importance in world affairs for a number of reasons: strategic location, large and growing populations, resources, and above all, the magnitude of their own problems, to which the rest of the world cannot remain indifferent. This is a political and economic problem--one that cannot readily be influenced by military force. These changes that have occurred in the international order require new techniques in problem-solving. The accelerated pace of change has upset traditions, created new demands, encouraged revolutionary ferment. It affects what nations *want* and what they can and cannot do. Governments of today must deal with complex situations requiring political and economic finesse. Successful will do to those who exhibit knowledge and appreciation for the delicate use of relevant forms of force. Nuclear power is no longer relevant, other than it helping to maintain a strategic balance. Nuclear force within the new environment is only "usable" as a deterrent force--and as Glenn Snyder has said--deterrence is the negative application of power. What in time needed is a means of expressing positive applications of power.

2. <u>The nature of the new environment is political.</u>

The cold war has been a political confrontation. The new environment does not necessarily mean that the cold war is over, but it should provide realization to those who still doubt that political struggle requires political strategy. Old and comfortable concepts will not suffice in this battle. The very nature of the "third force" is political. Russia desires a new format for relations because of politics and national interest. The United States can no longer afford to labor under the false misconception that it is waging a battle against the devil and that nuclear strength and God will see it through. The commitment to the strategy of deterrence is necessary--if for no other reason than to maintain the balance that was so important in the establishment of this framework of international politics. But continued expansion of "flexible response" is needed in order to provide adequate and proper support for the political objectives of the nation. There cannot be sole reliance upon a negative form of power. Force, and certainly strategy, are still requisites, but complete emphasis and total reliance upon nuclear strength constitutes continued denial of "new realities" and is another step down the lonesome road of "old myths." The many-faceted aspects of a political conflict demand equal diversification in its military support.

3. Policy and power have definite limitations. It must be realized that foreign policy and the extended use of

The cold war has been a political confrontation. The new environment does not necessarily mean that the cold war is over, but it should provide realization to those who still doubt that political struggle requires political strategy. Old and comfortable concepts will not suffice in this battle. The very nature of the "third force" is political. Russia inspires a new format for relations because of politics and national interest. The United States can no longer afford to labor under the false misconception that it is waging a battle against the devil and that nuclear strength and God will see it through. The commitment to the strategy of deterrence is necessary--if for no other reason than to maintain the balance that was so important in the establishment of this framework of international politics. But continued expansion of "flexible response" is needed in order to provide adequate and proper support for the political objectives of the nation. There cannot be more reliance upon a nonviable form of power. Force, and certainly already economically exhausted, but complete economic and total military capabilities" and is another step down the lonesome road of "old myths." A newly-elected member of a political community should expect dire ridicule if its military submit.

7. Policy and power have flexible limitations. It must be realized that foreign policy and the structured use of

power have definite limitations. The United States should not strive for the impossible fulfillment of a perfect or Utopian policy, but work toward acceptance of the fact that it cannot control all of the factors that are at play in international politics. The United States should not lose its sense of balance between ends and means, and should not disregard the true nature and limitations of power.

4. Military objectives must be attuned to political objectives. The most basic requirement of national security is the capability and willingness to make decisions; decisions with respect to objectives being sought and the policies or courses of action to achieve them. The validity of objectives depends upon the probable success of policy choices in the face of opposition. This entails suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. When the validity of an objective has been established, the policy choice is made and the risk accepted. The key issue in this "stragegy selection" process is the clear delineation of objectives. The selection of these political goals should then govern military posture and action.

5. There is a need for public re-orientation. Once again, traditional military victory is virtually impossible in any nuclear war, and it is even doubtful in a conventional war unless political objectives and national purpose are clearly understood. Because of a gap between the American

power have definite limitations. The United States should not strive for the impossible fulfillment of a perfect or utopian policy, but work toward acceptance of the fact that it cannot control all of the factors that are at play in international politics. The United States should not lose its sense of balance between ends and means, and should not disregard the true nature and limitations of power.

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5. There is a need for public understanding. Once again, conditional military victory is virtually impossible in any nuclear war, and if it were obtained in a conventional war, the cost would be prohibitive. Continue of a gap between the American

public and responsible decision-makers, this will require massive public re-education, specifically concerning the substance and nature of the environment, the effective uses of relevant force, and an appreciation for traditional diplomacy. The American body-politic has been subjected for almost twenty years to a steady diet of "crusades," moral superiority, and the magical powers of the "American way." But it is only through re-evaluation, fresh purpose, diplomacy, strategic balance and diversification, and a realization of the realities and relevance of force that peace can be achieved, order maintained, and stability preserved.

6. <u>There is a need for prudence and moderation</u>. Generally speaking, the current American policy is to coexist peaceably with professed enemies while at the same time attempting to work slowly and warily for additional accommodations that will decrease even further the tensions that exist. This policy appears prudent and moderate, and shows signs of the realism that must prevail. The basis of this policy, of course, is the fact that we are in the nuclear age. While the United States enjoys a certain nuclear superiority, it does not have absolute nuclear supremacy. This is the military equation which makes prudence and moderation indispensable, which makes victory by unconditional surrender an irrational and impossible American objective. Americans can no longer suffer the disillusionment

public and responsible decision-makers, this will require massive public re-education, specifically concerning the seriousness and nature of the curtailment, the effective uses of reserve force, and an explanation for treatment of dissent. The American body-politic has been subjected for almost twenty years to a steady diet of "crusades," most of which have failed, and the national power of the "American way," but it is only through re-examination, tough purpose, diplomacy, and the medical power of the "American way," accepting patience and diversification, and a realization of the realities and relevance of force that peace can be achieved, order maintained, and stability preserved.

6. There is a need for prudence and moderation.

Generally speaking, the current American policy is to combat peacefully with presumed enemies only at the same time attempting to work slowly and warily for additional accommodations that will decrease even further the tensions that exist. This policy appears prudent and moderate, and seems right to the reason that most normally. The basis of this policy, of course, is the fact that we are in the nuclear age. While the United States enjoys a certain measure of nuclear superiority, it does not have absolute nuclear supremacy. This is the military equation which makes peaceful coexistence mandatory, which means victory by maximum effort suicidal, and which makes limited war necessary. Vietnam can no longer suffer the disillusionment objectives. Americans can be taught to understand that

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